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ABATEMENT.
Where the defendant in an action of malicious prosecution dies while an
appeal from a judgment in his favor is pending, the action abates. Clark v.
Carroll, 338.
ACCORD.
1. Where accord was to do a thing in satisfaction at future day, per-
formance must be accepted in satisfaction of debt or claim. Johnson v. Hunt,
777, and note.
2. Parol release of judgment for money, in consideration of payment of less
sum, invalid, though indorsed upon execution. Weber v. Couch, 682.
3. Agreement in writing not to take any proceedings or judgment in con-
sideration of payment of specific sum for which judgment was rendered in
instalments, which were duly paid, is without consideration, and will not pre-
vent plaintiff issuing execution for interest. Beer v. Foakes, 748.
ACCOUNT. See PAuTmNnsHIr, 8.
If two executors purchase land with trust funds, and it does not appear that
persons interested in estate are debarred by acquiescence or otherwise from
availing themselves of advantage of purchase, one executor cannot maintain a
bill in equity against the other for account and share of profits. Bowen v. -ich-
ardson, 338.
ACTION. See ATTAcEWaNT, 2. Co-mmox CARRIER, 15. DAMAGES, 9. FRAUDS,
STATUTE OF, 3. INTOXICATING LIQUOR, 3. NEGLIGENCE, 14. PARTNER-
sHIp, 1, 2. RALnou, 13. TENDER.
1. Where landlord with consent of tenants sold their share of crop with his
own, and afterwards brought action for non-acceptance, his not owning all,
neither constitutes a defence nor diminishes damages. Davis v. Harness, 214.
2. Declaration charging defendants with fraudulently and falsely selling goods
of his own fabrication as manufacture of plaintiff, by which plaintiff was
deprived of sales, sets forth actionable injury. Tobacco Manufactory v. Com-
merce, 542.
3. Case for deceit will not lie against person for obtaining credit by falsely
and fraudulently representing himself to be "a person safely to be trusted and
given credit to :" the false representations must consist of definite statements
of fact. Lyons v. Briggs, 619.
4. SURVIVAL oF ACTIONS, 353, 425.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1861, August 5. See UNITED STATES, 6.
1864, June 3. See NATIONAL BAllis, 3.
1874, Revised Statutes.
Sect. 639. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 9.
Sect. 643. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 8.
Sect. 689. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1.
Sect. 716. See UNITED STATES, 1.
Sect. 916. See UNITED STATES, I.-
Sect. 941. See AbmiRATY, 2.
(819)
INDEX.
.ACTS OF CONGRESS.
Sect. 2499.
Sect. 2504.
Sect. 3466.
Sect. 4283.
Sect. 4747.
Sect. 5198.
Sect. 5209.
Sect. 5211.
Sect. 5392.
Sect, 5440.
Sect. 5519.
1875, February 16.
1875, March 3.
1875, March 3.
1875, March 3.
1876, August 15.
1881, February 26.
See UNITED STATES, 7.
See UNITED STATES, 2.
See NATIONAL BANKS, 7.
See ADMIRALTY, 10, 11
See PENSION, 2.
See ASSIGNMENT, 4.
See CRIMINAL LAw, 19.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 26.
See CRIM NAL LAW, 25, 26.
See CRIMINAL LAW. 19.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21.
See ADMIRALTY, 7.
See CoarolATiox, 18.
See REMOVAL OP CAUSESI 9.
See UNITED STATES COURTS, 1, 2, 4.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 27.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 26.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR.
ADMIRALTY. See ATTACHMENT, 1. CRIMINAL LAW, 17. ERRORS AN)
APPEALS, 9. SHIPPING, 3.
I. Generally.
1. Part owners of vessel are tenants in common, and statement of one of
them in another suit as to amount of damage, is not evidence against the
others. Clark v. Weeks, 139.
2. Under sect. 941 Rev. Stat., judgment against both principal and sureties
in stipulation, executed thereunder, to release vessel against which process has
issued, may be recovered at time of rendering decree in principal cause. In
Matter of Warden, 748.
3. Qcere, Whether decree is lien on real estate of stipulators after appeal.
I.
4. Master can neither sell nor hypothecate cargo, except in case of urgent
necessity, and lender is chargeable with notice of facts on which master appears
to rely as justification for his act. Bank v. Brigantine, 619.
5. Cargo-owner finding vessel, with his cargo on board, at port of refuge,
needing repairs which can not be effected without cost to him of more than he
would lose by taking his property, and paying vessel all lawful charges, may
pay charges and reclaim property. Id.
6. Where vessel before she breaks ground, is so injured by fire that cost of
repairs would exceed her value when repaired, and she is rendered unsea-
worthy, a contract of affreightment for carriage of cotton by her to foreign
port, evidenced by ordinary bill of lading, providing for payment of freight
money, on delivery of cotton, is thereby dissolved, so that shipper is not
liable for any part of freight money, nor for expenses paid by vessel for com-
pressing and stowing the cotton. Ellis v. Ins. Co., 415.
7. Libellant in suit in rem growing out of a collision, claimed $27,000 dam-
ages. After attachment of vessel in District Court, a stipulation in sum Qf
$2100, as her appraised value, was given. Libel having been dismissed by
Circuit Court on appeal, libellant appealed to U. S. Supreme Court : Held,
that matter in dispute did not exceed $5000. as required by sect. 3 of Act of
February 16th 1875. Starin v. Schooner Jesse Williamson, Jr., 476.
8. Decree against vessel for $27,000 would not establish liability of claim-
ant to respond for that amount in personam, unless he was owner at time of col-
lision, which fact must appear by record to authorize court to consider $27,000
as value of matter in dispute on such appeal. Id.
U:. Collision.
9. Where both parties are in fault, damage is divsaed equally, and decree
is in favor of the one suffering most for half the difference between the losses.
Practice in such cases. Reynolds v. Vanderbilt, 69.
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10. Statute of Limited Liability does not apply to such a case until balance
of damage has been struck. Reynolds v. Tanderbilt, 69.
11. Quere: Must benefit of statute be claimed in pleadings ? Id.
12. Where libellant's injury has arisen from fault of two vessels, damages are
apportioned equally between them, and decree should be for one-half against
each ; any balance of unrecovered half to be enforced against the other. Ster-
ling v. Peterson, 140.
13. Ocean steamer starting from crowded slip should have look-out at stern,
and use towage if necessary to avoid injury. Id.
AGENT. See ACTiox, 2. ATTAcHMENT, 10. BILLS AND NOTES, 3, 10. CoN-
TIcT, 10. CoRPORATION, 12. EQUITY, 14. IssuiANcE, 1, 2, 8, 11, 15.
MUNICIPAL CORPORXATION, 5. RAILROAD, 12.
1. That lessee takes lease executed under seal, for unnamed principal, but
in his own name, will not render unnamed principal liable for rent. Borcher-
ling v. Katz, 748.
2. If vendor elect to give exclusive credit to husband, whom he knows to be
purchasing for his wife, he cannot afterwards recover from wife as principal;
but vendor ignorant of existence of principal can afterwards recover from him.
Iiller v. Watt, 338.
3. In absence of express authority or custom of trade, agent furnished with
funds cannot bind principal by purchase upon credit. Kamarouski v. Krum-
dick, 140.
4. Agent to solicit orders has no implied authority to receive payment. Me-
Kindly v. Durham, 140.
5. Order solicited by such agent is a mere proposal to be accepted or not, as
principal may see fit. rd.
6. The words "agents not authorized to collect," stamped in large legible
print on face of bill, are notice not to pay agent. Id.
7. Where agent enters into contract without disclosing his principal or agency,
if principal takes advantage of contract, he must do so subject to all rights
and equities of which other party, who had no knowledge of agency, might avail
himself as against agent, assuming him to be principal. Miller's Rx'rs v. Sul-
livan, 476.
8. Where agent commits tort while acting within scope of his employment,
he and employer may be sued separately or jointly; and it does not matter
in what proportions, if any, they share the benefits. Coal Co. v. fcCulloh,
476.
9. Cases in which head employee has been held not liable for trespasses of
workmen under him, are distinguishable from those where tort is in consequence
of command or neglect of general superintendent. id.
10. Broker not entrusted with possession of property, contracted in his own
name to sell same to vendee, who had no knowledge that broker was not real
owner, but dealt with him as such. Broker notified principals that he had sold
for them, and directed where to ship property. Owners, without knowledge
of how broker had contracted, and without conduct clothing broker with au-
thority to receive payment or any possession, actual or constructive, of pro-
perty, delivered same to vendee. Held, payment to broker no bar to recovery
by owners. Crosby v. Hill, 683.
ALIMONY. See HUSBAiND AND WIFE, I.
ANNUITY. See ArroRTIOxMeINT.
APPORTIONMENT.
A. and wife conveyed their farm to B., husband of granddaughter, in con-
sideration of his agreement, secured by bond and mortgage on premises, to pay
A. annuity of $250 on 1st of April, for life, and if wifesurvived, to payheran
annuity of $200 for life. A.'s wife outlived him. Held, that her annuitywas
apportionable. In re Iron Co., 748.
ARBITRATION. See PAuTNnEtsnP, 10, 11.
Award based on statements made by each party not set aside on bill filed
822 INDEX.
ARBITRATION.
by one alleging drunkenness at time of reference and statement, where proof
shows he was capable of acting intelligently. 0'Nieil v. Rodgers, 214.
ARREST. See EXTRADITION, 1.
ASSIGNAMNT. See ATTACHMENT, 8. BANK, 2. BILLS AND NOTES, 16. CoR-
TPORATION, 2, 3. ESTOPPEL, 3. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1. PARTNER-
SHIP, 3.
1. Delivery of savings bank book as collateral security transfers an equitable
title to deposit superior to subsequent attachment. Toft v. Bowker, 70.
2. Assignment for benefit of creditors who should release, with reservation
of surplus to assignor, is fraudulent and void as to creditors not releasing.
Lawrence v. Norton, 258, and note.
3. Statutes allowing preferences among creditors should be strictly con-
strued, and assignments creating such preferences held void, when not in strict
compliance with terms of law. Id.
4. Assignee for benefit of creditors under state law not "legal representative"
of assignor under sect. 30 of National Currency Act of 1864, providing for a
recovery of twice the amount of interest in case of usury. Barnet v. Bank,
70.
5. Provision in contract that if contractor fails to pay for labor and mate-
rials, other contracting parties may withhold moneys earned under contract and
pay same, does not deprive contractor of right of alienation, and his assignees
will be entitled to moneys earned under contract in order in which they ac-
quired title. Shannon v. Mayor, 748.
6. Statute required assignee for benefit of creditors to sell all the assigned
property at public auction within 120 days. Held, that deed authorizing the as-
signee to sell at private sale, at his discretion as to time and manner, was void.
Jaffray v. McGehee, 344.
7. Insolvent guardian, who had misappropriated his ward's money, within
six months before filing of petition in insolvency against him, in order to pre-
fer his ward, deposited his own money in his name as guardian. Held, that
his assignee could maintain bill in equity to recover amount, although ward was
ignorant of misappropriation and insolvency. Bush v. Moore, 344.
8. Two debtors made an assignment: one was subsequently discharged in
bankruptcy, and the other removed from the state. Afterwards a creditor, who
had accidentally failed to become a party to assignment, sought to do so by bill
in equity. Held, that although trustees had funds sufficient to pay him same
dividend which had been paid to other creditors, he could not do so. Bank v.
Smith, 214.
9. Not void'because it does not direct payments pjo rata in case there be not
enough, to pay in full. Unless otherwise directed by assignment, law imposes
that duty upon assignee. Lindsay v. Guy, 542.
10. Where insolvent debtors have made an assignment, setting out in deed
names of creditors and amounts due, persons so named are cestuis que trust, and
entitled to equitable relief in case of mismanagement, waste or violation of
trust by assignees. Cohen v. Aorris, 543.
11. If trustee mismanages and wastes trust property, and persists in so
doing, injunction and appointment of receiver is proper remedy. Id.
12. In such a case as above, where debt is undisputed, creditor, although his
claim is not reduced to judgment, may assail assignment as fraudulent, and
may seek to set it aside as to property obtained from him by fraudulent
representations with which assignees are connected. Id.
13. Whether on final hearing complainants cap both attack assignment as
fraudulent and claim under it, not decided. Id.
ASSUMPSIT.
When contract for building has not been so performed as to justify recovery
thereon, the value of the work and materials can only be recovered in .sumpsit
when owner has actually accepted building, which is not necessarily implied by
mere occupation thereof. Bozarth v. Dudley, 140.
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ATTACHMIENT. See ASSIGNrENT, 1. MORTGAGE, 1.
1. Wages of seamen on coasting voyage on Atlantic coast subject to. White
v. Dunn, 808.
2. Mortgagee of goods attached, while in possession of mortgagor, by invalid
attachment, may maintain replevin against attaching officer. Allen v. Wright,
808.
3. Money held under invalid attachment may be recovered of attaching offi-
cer in action for money had and received. Id.
4. Lien acquired by attachment of easily removable property is lost by
neglect to retain possession. Thompson v. Bak.er, 141.
5. Where attachment is only of interest of co-tenant, sale of whole article
is unlawful. Id.
6. Officer may break into shop or other building not connected with dwell-
ing-house, in order to serve process of attachment, provided he first asks ad-
mission, if any person is present to grant it, and is refused. Clark v. Wilson,
415.
7. He is not obliged to first seek elsewhere for chattels to attach. Id.
8. Assignment in good faith of wages to be earned under existing contract,
is valid against subsequent garnishment, provided garnishee have such notice
of assignment as will enable him to disclose it in his affidavit. Tiernay v. Mlc-
Garity, 620.
9. Levy of attachment for debt of grantor upon lands fraudulently conveyed
gives lien which is not disturbed by decree setting aside conveyance and sub-
jecting property to sale for payment of judgment recovered after levy. Mc-
Kinney v. Bank, 70.
10. B.'s funds on deposit in bank were attached. The bank, as garnishee,
showed that deposit was in name of "B., agent;" and that it knew nothing
of any principal. It appearing dint no one had, as principal, ever claimed the
deposit, Held, that bank was liable as garnishee. Proctor v. Greene, 416.
11. The Maryland Act of 1876, ch. 285, prescribed a mode in which the
claimant, by filing petition and giving bond, might procure discharge of pro-
perty levied on. Held, I. That upon trial of issue joined upon such claim,
the question of damages as well as right of property is to be settled. 2.
That petition need not in terms claim damages. 3. That requirement by said
act of a bond in "do u ble the appraised value," &c., necessitates an appraise-
ment wherever there is claim. 4. That taking bond in less than amount
prescribed, does not defeat claimant's recovery nor prevent inquiry of damages.
Turner v. Lytle, 339.
12. Whether claimant, knowing of levy and seizure, is compelled to resort
to this method of asserting his rights, quere? Id.
ATTORNEY. See EVIDENCE, 4.
1. Is liable for fees for service and entry of his writs, and neither serving
officer nor clerk is required to perform the services without prepayment. Til-
ton v. Wright, 466, and note. .
2. Compromise of suit by attorney with apparent authority binds client,
unless so unfair as to put other party on inquiry or imply fraud. Black v.
Rogers, 70.
3. May contract for contingent fee, and such agreement does not make him
party to action, or render evidence admissible of his personal treatment of
opposite party. Gilchrist v. Brande, 620. *
4. Where property is conveyed to attorney in trust, without his professional
advice, and he mortgages same for purpose of raising money which he claims
is due him from cestui que trust, and afterwards sells the property and appro-
priates proceeds to his own use, he cannot be summarily disbarred, but injured
party must be left to his remedy by suit. People v. Appleton, 476.
5. In exceptional cases attorney's misconduct in his private capacity may be
of so gross a character as to require his disbarment. Id.
AUCTION SALES. See AucioxN SALEs, 1.
AWARD. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 10.
BAIL.
Where bail in criminal case could not reasonably anticipate and prevent
INDEX.
BAIL.
default, and with proper diligence find and surrender his principal after default
before death, proper case is made for court, in its discretion, to relieve surety.
State v. Traphagen, 543.
BAILMENT.
1. Plaintiff delivered bonds to bank and received this writing: " Received
of J. D. Whitney $4000 for safe keeping as special deposit. J. M. Waite, C."
Reld, that bank was only liable for fraud or gross negligence. Whitner v.
Bank, 683.
2. Facts that safe was left open during transaction of business ; that there was
no gate in passageway from rear of banking-room behind counter, and that only
one person was left. in charge of bank about noon each day, do not seem so
unusual as to be accounted negligence, much less gross negligence. Id.
BANK. See BAIL3MENT. NATIONAL BANKS.
1. Is under no obligation to pay any sum on check payable to drawer's order,
and by him assigned, when drawer has not sufficient funds in bank to pay
check in full. Coates v. Preston, 477.
2. Three days after an assignment for benefit of creditors the assignors gave
a check, dating it four days before the assignment. Bank, with knowledge of
assignment, paid check on day it was given. Hed, that bank was put on
inquiry, and that payment of check was not a defence as to assignee. Chafe
v. Bank, 477.
3. One buying stock of bank from the bank, is entitled to rely upon assur-
ances of officer of bank as to.its financial condition, and if already a stock-
holder, is not bound to avail himself of his right to examine the books of the
bank ; but a representation that stock is worth $100 per share is mere expres-
sion of opinion. Bank v. Runt, 477.
4. National bank purchasing its own stock to protect itself from loss, is
bound to sell same within six months, and may sell on credit, taking note with
stock as collateral. Id.
5. Abuse of corporate powers not sufficient defence to such a note. Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Debt contracted and payable in Canada, by resident of state to resident of
Canada, not barred by discharge under U. S. Bankrupt Act, when foreign
creditor neither proved debt, nor in any way was party to proceedings, nor
had personal notice thereof. McDougall v. Page, 683.
BILL OF LADING. See SHIPPING, 1.
BILL OF PARTICULARS. See PRACTICE, 3.
BILL OF REVIEW.
The time during which Circuit Court has no control over decree in conse.
quence of pendency of an appeal, does not run against two year limit for bringing
bill of review. .Ensminger v. Powers, 418.
BILL OF SALE.
Signature to by mark, good without witness. Larkin v. City, 214.
BILLS AND NOTES. See CHECK. CRIMINAL LAW, 13. EVIDENCE. 18.
GUARANTY. HUSBAND ANDoWIFE, 16. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, S.
MEcHAnics' LIEN. UNITED STATES COURTS, 4.
I. Form, consideration, 4-c.
1. Promissory note, payable "1 on demand, or in three years from this
date," with interest "during said term, or for such further time as said prin-
cipal sun or any part thereof shall remain unpaid," not negotiable. Mahoney
v. fRtzpatrick, 339.
2. To render defendant liable on note, he must have been aware at time of
signing same, or possessed opportunities, such as a reasonable, cautious man
would have exercised, of knowing that he was signing note for payment of
money, as represented by paper. Kogel v. Toten, 478.
3. Mere addition of word "agent" does not release drawer of bill from
personal liability. Bank v. Cook, 215.
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BILLS AND NOTES.
4. In action on promissory note it was alleged that sole consideration was
debt to payee, which he had voluntarily discharged. Held, it appearing from
agreed facts that "release" had been given, presumption was that it was valid
in forjn. Carvery. Bank, 215.
5. Debt voluntarily released not sufficient consideration. Id.
6. The conclusion "' witness our hand and seal" in printed blank does not
alone make note sealed instrument; nor will mere attaching seal or scroll
without some recital. Brooks v. Kisers, 141.
7. The following instrument held negotiable: 1 Sixty days after date I pro-
mise to pay C. Toler or order, $150, at either bank in the city of Augusta,
Ga., for one end spring top buggy, harness, whip and mat, this day delivered to
me, upon the distinct understanding that the title was not to pass me until paid
for in full, and he is authorized to take possession of same at any time until
fully paid for." Howard v. Simpkins, 141.
8. In action upon non-negotiable promissorynote, payable to third person or
bearer, plaintiff offered to show that when defendant gave him the note, he told
defendant it should be in his name or to his order, and that defendant replied
"It is all right, it makes no difference, it is payable to bearer and you can
collect." Held, inadmissible. Whitwelti v. Winslow, 808.
9. Promissory note for certain amount, payable to person named or bearer"with interest the same as savings bank pay," is not negotiable. Id.
10. In action on following note : "For value received as treasurer of the
town of Monmouth, I promise to pay D. M. Ross or order $160, in one year
from date with interest. Win. G. Brown, treasurer," it was not shown or
claimed that treasurer was authorized by the town to issue the note on its be-
half. Held, that note must be regarded as note of Brown. Ross v. Brown,
416.
11. One who signs instrument for payment of money only (whether nego-
tiable or not), leaving amount blank, and intrusts it to another with authority
to fill blank with agreed sum, will, as to third persons without knowledge, be
bound by act of person to whom instrument was entrusted, although he fills
blank with larger sum than was agreed. Harvester Co. v. McLeane, 543.
12. So held where figures $45 were in upper left hand corner when note was
signed, and it was delivered with understanding that $45 should be filled in
body of note, and note was made for $450. Id.
13. Figures in corner were no part of note and unauthorized change in them
did not vitiate it. Id.
14. One who takes note of debtor for amount of debt then past due, espe-
cially if signed or endorsed by third person, and payable at future day, will be
presumed to extend time for payment of debt until day fixed in note, and such
extension makes creditor innocent holder for value. Id.
II. Riglds of Parties.
15. Payee of lost note, negotiable and payable to him or bearer. can only
get relief in equity. Adams v. Edmunds, 683.
16. Makerof note, transferred after it is due, sued in name of transferree,
can only plead defences existing between himself and payee growing out of
note transaction. Armstrong v. Noble, 808.
17. Drawee without funds who pays bill, is entitled to be reimbursed ; and
several drawers, some securities for others, are alike liable to reimburse drawee
in absence of contrary understanding. Church v. Swops, 71.
18. Where 0., at time of execution, puts his name on back of bill payable
to S., he becomes, as to drawee, a drawer. Id.
III. Endorsement, acceptance, 6-c.
19. In no case payment unless expressly so agreed; and marking account
"paid" and signing same before protest, does not constitute such an agreement.
Weaver v. Nixon, 141.
20. Endorser of paid note or bill is liable as upon new contract, and no notice
or demand is necessary to fix his liability; he impliedly warrants that it is a
subsisting obligation, genuine, and not tainted by illegal consideration. Airy
v. Nelson, 416.
VOL. XXXI.-104
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21. To render writer of letter of credit liable, either upon implied acceptance
of, or agreement to accept, drafts taken on faith of letter, drafts must be taken
for valuable consideration. Sherwin v. Brigham, 477.
22. Promise to have drafts discounted, and to take up notes on .hich per-
sons taking drafts are liable as indorsers, not a valuable consideration. Id.
23. If letter provides that drafts drawn under its authority shall be used
only for purpose of being discounted at particular bank, persons taking such
drafts with notice that they have been offered to the bank for discount and
refused, cannot recover thereon. Id.
24. Where negotiable draft with security thereon was drawn and accepted by
drawees, who held mortgage to secure advances, and received property of
drawer sufficient to pay draft, after negotiation acceptors were absolutely bound,
drawer was bound to pay if acceptors did not, and his security was equallylia-
ble with him. As to holder, acceptors may be regarded as makers and drawer
as first endorser. Parmelee v. Williams, 749.
25. Where indulgence was granted to acceptors in consideration of payment
of eighteen per cent. interest, and acceptors became insolvent, security was
released. Id.
IV. Presentment, 4-c.
26. Presentment and protest of foreign bill must be according to law of place
where payable. Pierce v. Indselth, 215.
27. Court will take judicial notice of notary's seal. Impression on paper
by die with wltich ink is used, sufficient. Id.
BOND.
1. One not named in but signing bond may be held as an obligor, if an inten-
tion to so charge him clearly appear. Partrdge v. Jones, 71.
2. Voluntary obligation on sufficient consideration, not contravening policy
of law or repugnant to some statute, is valid at common law, notwithstanding
attempt may have been to execute it pursuant to statute with terms of which
it does not strictly comply. Barnes v. Brook-man, 808.
BROKER. See AGENT, 10. CONTRACT, 16, 17.
Right of to recover advances on illegal contract. N~orton v. Blinn, 783, note.
CASES AFFIRAIED, COMMENTED ON, OVERRULED, ETC.
Castellain v. Preston, 168 (L. R., 8 Q. B. Div., 613) ; reversed. Castellain
v. Preston, 769.
Erskine v. Adeane, L. R., 8 Ch. App. 756, disapproved. M3organ v. Griffith,
145.
Gaylord v. Imhoff, 26 Ohio St. 317, distinguished. Mortley v. Flanagan,
77.
Gillet v. Railroad Co., 55 Mlo. 315, overruled. Boogher v. Association, 72.
Locke v. Williamson, 40 Wis. 277 ; Bonnell v. Jacobs, 36 Id. 59; Pearson
v. Martin, 28 Id. 265 ; Merriam. v. Field, 39 Id. 578 ; Mloorehouse v. Com-
stock, 42 Id. 630, distinguished. Olson v. Mayer, 287.
Lyons v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 13 R. I. 347, reversed. Lyons
v. Providence Mashington Ins. Co., 419.
MScLain v. Simington, 37 Ohio St. 484, followed and approved. Partridge
v. Jones, 71.
Nicholson v. G. W. Railroad Co., 5 C. B. (N. S.) 436, distinguished.
Hays v. The Penna. Co., 39.
Plevin v. Hershall, 25 E. Oh. 21, distinguished. Morgan v. Kidder, 693.
Smith v. Barclay, 21 Am. Law Reg. 408, overruled. Barclay v. Smith,
435.
Sprague v. Rhodes, 4 R. I. 301, affirmed. Gorton v. Titfany, 418.
Thompson v. Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 238, distinguished. Ins. Co. v. Doster,
60.
Union Ins. Co. v. Chipp, 93 Ill. 96, referred to. Pierce v. -People, 623.
CAVEAT EMPTOR. See JuDICIAL SA.
'CHARITY.
1. English doctrine as to superstitious uses has never been adopted in this
INDEX.
CHARITY.
country, and is inconsistent with the religious liberty guaranteed by our consti-
tutions. Kehoe v. Kehoe, 655, and note.
2. A., ' for the purpose of founding an institution for the education of youth in
St. Louis county, Missouri," granted property to B. and his successors in trust
"for the use and benefit of the Russell Institute of St. Louis, Missouri," with
directions to sell and account and pay proceeds, " to Thomas Allen, president
of the board of trustees of the said Russell Institute," whose receipt should be
a full discharge. Held, a valid charity, though institution neither established
nor incorporated in lifetime of donor or Allen. Russell v. Allen, 339.
3. Georgia code provides that "no person leaving a wife or child, or descend-
ants of a child, shall by will devise more than one-third of his estate to any
charitable, religious, educational or civil institution, to the exclusion of such
wife or child; and in all cases the will containing such devise shall be exe-
cuted at least ninety days before the death of the testator, or such devise shall be
void." Held, not to invalidate charitable devise contained in will executed
within ninety days of death, unless testator leaves wife or child, or descend-
ants of a child. Jones v. Habersham, 478.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See MORTGAGE, I.
CHECK. See BANR, 1
CITY. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
CIVIL RIGHTS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See PLEDGE,
COLLISION. See ADMIRALTY, II.
COMMON CARRIER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17. RAILROAD, 3, 5.
1. Is insurer of goods at common law, and contract of exemption from such
liability, nmust be founded upon some consideration. Taylor v. R. R. Co., 416.
2. Liable for baggage checked to point beyond and lost after leaving its own
line, of passenger to whom it has sold coupon ticket. 1. R. Co. v. W1eaver, 128.
3. In such a case liability of defendant not affected by payment made by or
release given to the other companies. Id.
4. Is not liable in trover to consignor for surrendering goods entrusted to
him for carriage, to officer, who attaches them upon legal process against con-
signee. French v. Trans. Co., 808.
5. Common carrier, in such case, is not liable to consignor, after notice by
him to hold goods, for not notifying officer or taking steps to stop goods in
transita. Id.
6. Freight discrimination, based solely on the amount shipped, are contrary
to public policy; disfavored party can recover excess with interest. Hays v.
The Penna. Co., 39, and note.
7. State law to prevent discrimination in rates from point within to point
without the state is not a regulation of commerce within the Federal Constitu-
tion. People v. Railway Co., 71.
8. Regulation entitling persons purchasing tickets before entering cars to
discount, is reasonable, and does not violate statute prescribing equal rates to
all. Swan v. Railroad, 71.
9. Passenger ejected for non-payment of fare not entitled to carriage in
same train to station beyond, by tendering fare from station at which he was
ejected. Id.
10. Contract that in case of loss. carrier shall pay specified sum will not,
without expressly so stipulated, relieve carrier from liability for fill value of
goods lost through its negligence. Black v. Goodrich Trans. Co., 141.
11. Non-delivery of goods and admission that same are lost are presumptive
evidence of negligence. Ad.
12. Receiving goods for transportation beyond its own line only responsible
as forwarder, in absence of special contract. Railroad Co. v. Alyrick, 215.
13. Receipt stated goods to be "consigned" to parties beyond terminus;
and, after describing property, it added "for transportation * * * to the ware-
house at - " on margin was "*Notice. - See rules of transportation on
828 INDEX.
COMMON CARRIER.
the back hereof." These rules stated that company would only act as for-
warder. On margin of receipt was notice that it might be "exchanged for a
through bill of lading." Held, not a through contract. Railroad Co. V. My-
rick, 215.
14. What constitutes contract of carriage question of general law. Id.
15. Actions against common carrier for breach of contract of carriage and
delivery of goods may be either ex contractu or ex delicto; but same law is
applicable, and measure of damages is equally a question of law in either case.
Railroad Co. v. Pumnphrey, 478.
16. As general rule measure of damages in such cases is value of goods at
place of destination, with compensation for actual loss, which is natural and
proximate consequence of act; loss sustained by plaintiff in general business
is not within. Id.
17. Common carriers deliver property at their peril; it is their duty to be
diligent to secure delivery to person entitled, and they can refuse delivery until
reasonable evidence is furnished that party claiming is party entitled. Id
CONDITIONAL SALE. See SALE, 4. TRovnR, 3.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See CO-nhON CARRIER, 14. CoRPORATION, 22. IN-
SOLVENT LAv, 5. MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoN, 7.
1. Contract of married woman, made in one state and valid there, is to be
held valid in another state. Holmes v. Reynolds, 620.
2. Bond was executed in New York to indemnify against loss on bond en-
tered into in Louisiana; a pre-existing liability entered into without request
was sole consideration, and was by law of Louisiana sufficient, by that of New
York insufficient; Held, that the law of Louisiana governed. Pritchard v.
Norton, 72.
3. Divorce in one state where jurisdiction depends entirely upon residence
there of party applying, at suit of husband against wife residing in another
state, who was not personally served and did not appear, but was ignorant of
action until after judgment, is not a bar to a subsequent action by wife in her
state for divorce, alimony, &c., especially where first judgment was based upon
alleged cause, false in fact. Cook v. Cook, 142.
CONSIDERATION. See BILLS AND NOTES, 4, 14, 21. COMMON CARRIER, I
CONTRACT, 18, 19, 21. CRIMI1NAL LAw, 13. EmRORS AND APPEALS, 8.
GIFT, 3. INTEREST, 3. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 11.
Part payment of note after maturity no valid consideration for extension of
time. Petty v. Douglass, 488.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See COMMON CARRIER, 7. CRIMINAL LAW, 27.
EMINENT DOSIAIN. INSOLvENCY, 4. INSURANCE, 1. MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATION, 9, 14, 20. PILOTAGE, I. UNITED STATES, 3, 4. USURY, 1.
WILL, 14.
1. Act prohibiting manufacture or sale of oleomargarine, &c., constitutional.
State v. Addington, 683.
2. State enactments regulating commerce between states not unconstitutional
unless conflicting with regulations of congress on same subject. Ird.
3. For the purpose of promoting public welfare, legislature has power to re-
gulate orforbid sale of patented articles, to same extent as articles not patented,
if no discrimination is made. Palmer v. State, 684.
4. Defendant was authorized by charter granted in Illinois, to run ferry between
St. Louis and East St. Louis ; one of incorporating acts provided "that the
ferry established shall be subject to the same taxes as are now, or hereafter may
be, imposed on other ferries within this state and under the same regulations
and forfeitures." Held, that ferry, having only one landing in Illinois, was
subject to same taxation as ferries wholly within the state ; and that most that
can be claimed is that company is exempt from other taxation and exactions
than such as were imposed on like property similarly situated. Ferry Co. v.
East St. Louis, 684.
5. There was proviso in charter that nothing therein should interfere with
police power of municipal corporations. Held, that imposition of license fee
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of $100 per boat by city of East St. Louis was within the proviso, and was
not a regulation of commerce or duty of tonnage within U. S. Constitution.
Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 684.
6. Enrolment and licensing of boats under U. S. laws did not exclude right
to impose license in question. Id.
7. 1st and 2d sections of Civil Rights Act, passed March 1st, 1875, are un-
constitutional as applied to states. U. S. v. Stanley, 790.
8. Fourteenth Amendment is prohibitory upon states only, and under it
congress can only pass legislation corrective of state laws or acts. Id.
9. Thirteenth Amendment relates only to slavery and involuntary servitude:
the denial of equal accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of
public amusement imposes no badge of slavery or involuntary servitude, but at
most infringes rights which are protected from state aggression by Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
10. Whether congress, under commercial power, may pass laws securing to
all persons equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between two or
more states, undecided. .Zd.
11. Constitution does not require that title of Act should contain synopsis of
law, but that act should contain no matter variant from titie. .Howell v.
State, 749.
12. State officers cannot be compelled by courts, as against political power
of state, to levy and collect certain annual tax, and apply same to payment of
certain debts of state, in accordance with its contracts. State v. Juel, 749.
13. Changes in form of action and modes of proceeding do not amount to
impairment of contract, if adequate and efficacious remedy is left or substituted.
Antoni v. Greenhow, 749.
14. Legislature possesses every power not delegated to some other depart-
ment, or expressly denied to it by constitution. Winch v. Tobin, 809.
15. Act providing that court of chancery may hear and determine bills to
quiet title, &c., where lands are unimproved and unoccupied, is not in violation
of constitutional guaranty of trial by jury. Gage v. Ewing, 809.
16. Where jurisdiction is bestowed upon court of chancery in case where
there existed before adoption of constitution a remedy at law, under which was
given right of trial by jury, it is presumed such a trial would be allowed, if
asked, on trial in chancery. Id.
17. Act of the state legislature to control and regulate shipment of freight
to points in other states is unconstitutional. Carton v. R. R. Co., 373, and note.
18. Inter-state contract of shipment is entire, and such laws as above, of
state where made, do not enter into it. State may regulate cbarges on ship-
ments of goods, by statutes not unconstitutional as regulations of commerce,
and, in absence of congressional legislation, such laws cannot be regarded as
encroaching on authority of general government. Id.
19. Such regulations of commerce only as impose burdens and restrictions
are forbidden. Id.
20. When municipal corporation enters into contract, legislature cannot im-
pair its taxing power, as to such contract, nor right to mandamus to compel
exercise of such taxing power in favor of the contractor. Assessors v. State, 142.
21. Sec. 5519 Rev. Stat. making criminal a conspiring or going in disguise
"for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws," &c., is unconstitutional. United
States v. Harris, 280.
22. An inspection law within art. 1, sect. 10 of the Constitution of the U. S.,
need not provide for inspection as to quality of article to be exported : not
unconstitutional if inspection extends only to form and dimensions of package.
Turner v. State, 198, and note.
23. State may lawfully, by such inspection law, require articles to be brought
to state warehouses to be inspected. Id.
24. Imposition upon such article, when exported, of tax to meet expenses of
inspection not unlawful discrimination between state buyer and exporter. Id.
25. Whether it is not exclusively the province of congress to decide whether
duty under inspection law is excessive, quaere. Id.
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26. State statute imposing tax on every passenger from foreign country,
landing in port of New York, who is not United States citizen, and holding
vessel which brings him liable for tax, is unconstitutional. New York v. Com-
pagnie Generale, 544.
27. In absence of legislation by congress, state has full power to legislate in
regard to rivers within its borders, and also to exercise all necessary police
regulations. This latter power embraces the construction of roads, canals,
bridges, &c., and can be exercised. more wisely by states than by distant
authority. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 544.
28. When state's power is exercised so as unnecessarily to obstruct naviga-
tion of river, congress may interfere and remove obstruction. Id.
29. Constitution of Georgia provides that "the General Assembly shall
have no power to grant corporate powers and privileges to private companies,
except, &c. * * * But it shall prescribe by law the manner in which such
powers shall be exercised by the courts." Held, not to take away power to
amend charters of existing corporations. Jones v. Habersham, 479.
30. One state cannot create a controversy with Another state within meaning
of that term as used in judicial clauses of Constitution of United States, by
assuming prosecution of debts owing by another state to its citizens. New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 479.
31. Constitution of New. Jersey provides: "To avoid improper influences
which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have
no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and
that shall be expressed in the title." Held, that the powers, however varied
and extended, which a new township may exercise constitute but one object
which is fairly expressed by title showing nothing more than legislative
purpose to establish such township. Montclair v. RTamsdell, 480.
32. An act authorizing individual to dispose of his property by lottery, not-
withstanding general statute prohibiting, under penalty, such a lottery, is not
violation of provision of Bill of Rights that no man is entitled to exclusive
public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services. Com-
monwealth v Whips, 443, and note.
33. The word "privilege" in Bill of Rights means public privilege, and
not mere privilege for exercise of private right. Id.
34. Right to grant such privileges in absence of such a constitutional pro-
vision as above. Id., note.
35. While Georgia constitution provides that private property shall not be
taken or damaged unless compensation be first paid, yet where owner permitted
company to build its road through his land and appropriate timber thereon
without objection until entire road had been completed, his property forming
but a small fraction thereof, he could not then enjoin use of entire road until
he is paid. Griffin v. Railroad Co., 340.
36. Statute imposing upon life insurance companies annual excise tax, "to
be determined by assessment of the same upon a valuation equal to the aggre-
gate net value of all policies in force on the 31st day of December then next
preceding, issued or assumed by such corporation or association, and held by
residents of the Commonwealth, at the rate of one-half of one per cent.'per
annum," is constitutional. Ins Co. v. Commonwealth, 340.
37. A. was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment on his plea of guilty
of murder in second degree, which sentence was, on his appeal, reversed and
set aside. At time of commission of homicide this conviction was an acquital
of murder in the first degree, but that law was changed before the plea of
guilty. Held, that new law was, as to this case, ex post facto, and that A.
could not be again tried for murder in the first degree. King v. State, 340.
38. Distinction between retrospective laws, affecting remedy or mode of
procedure and those operating directly on the offence held unsound where, in
latter case, they affect to his serious disadvantage any substantial right which
accused had under law as it stood when offence was committed. Id.
CONTEMPT. See PROHIBITION, 3.
CONTRACT. See ADMIIRALTv, 6. AssIGNMENT, 5. ASSUz.rSIT. BILL OP
SAT . COMMON CAxuura, 10, 13. CONFLICT or LAws, 1, 2. CONSTITO-
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TIONAL LAW, 12, 13, 18. CORPORATION, 23. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, I.
DEED, 4. DURESS, 1. EQUITY, 4, 16. EVIDENCE, 12. INSURANCE, 15.
INTEREST, 1. MASTER AND SERVANT, 3, 4. PILOTAGE, 3, 4. RAILROAD,
9. RESCISSION. SHIPPING, 2. TELEGRAPH. USURY, 2. WILL, 8.
1. Release from contract to marry good consideration for promise to pay
money. Snell v. Bray, 142.
2. Where reward is offered with no restrictions, one who performs the act
with a view of obtaining the reward need not give notice of that fact to person
making offer, as a condition precedent to recovery. Reiffv. Page, 142.
3. Fireman rescuing a person at great peril is not precluded from claiming
reward on ground that act was in line of his duty. Id.
4. Non-patentable improvement is not subject of exclusive property.
Albright v. Teas, 750.
5. Covenant by which covenantor restrains himself, generally and absolutely,
from exercising his skill and knowledge, is void. Id.
6. Agreement for valuable consideration, to interfere to bring about marriage
between others, is void. Johnson V. Hunt, 777, and note.
7. Where there has been failure to do the thing in alternative agreement to
do or pay, the money must be paid. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. .leichert, 72.
8. Breach of to support another for life, where such that it may be treated
as absolutely broken, entitles to damages for whole value of contract. Parker
v. Russell, 216.
9. Agreement to extend time for payment, if interest be paid in advance,
and security given, requires tender of interest and security to avail defendant.
IVilliains v. Wright, 143.
10. If agent of one of parties has, in prosecution of illegal enterprise for
his principal, received money or other property belonging to his principal, he
is bound to turn it over. Norton v. Blinn, 783, and note.
11. Where plaintiff received a more expensive press than he supposed he
had ordered, but, it being late in the season, and his customers pressing him,
set the press up and used it, Held, that he had accepted it. Dennis v. Stough-
ton, 810.
12. When it is intention of parties that there shall be no delivery of the
commodities, but that transactions shall be adjusted and settled by payment of
differences, such contracts are void. Cobb v. Prell, 609, and note.
13. It is duty of courts to scrutinize very closely contracts for future deliv-
ery, and if circumstances throw doubt upon question of intention of parties, it
is not too much to require partV claiming rights under such contract to show
affirmatively that it was made with view to actual delivery. Id.
14. Money placed in hands of third person by vendor and purehaser of
lands, under agreement to pay out of it assessments and taxes, can not be re-
covered by vendor upon procuring assessment to be set aside. Such agreement
held to be for indemnity of purchaser against liability to pay for improvement.
Cross v. Hayes, 544.
15. By written contract plaintiffs agreed to finish two stores, "and also to
finish front part oJ the basement, with the stairway going up to the second story,
and also the outside two cornices." In action to recover for extra work on
.nside of front basement wall, held, that extrinsic evidence was admissible to
aid in construction of contract, and that upon such evidence, it was for jury
to determine whether work in question was covered thereby. Bedard v. Bon-
ville, 544.
16. Evidence that overwhelmingly large proportion of all contracts for sale
of produce at Chicago Board of Trade, are mere settlements of differences,
not sufficient to justify jury in presuming that such was nature of transaction
in any particular case. Rountree v. Smith, 416.
17. Where plaintiffs do not sue on such contracts but for services as brokers
and money advanced, though it is possible they might, under some circum-
stances, be so connected with immorality of contract as to be affected by it if
proved ; they are certainly not in same position as party suing for enforcement
of original agreement. Id.
18. Agreement to pay sum to heir at law, who gets nothing by will, in con-
sideration of his forbearing to contest, by executor whose wife and daughter
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are legatees, is valid, if heir can show he honestly thought he had good and
reasonable ground for making claim, and honestly and in good faith intended
to oppose will : he is neither bound to allege or prove undue influence. Bellows
v. Powles, 810.
19. Where corporation is formed and succeeds to business of partnership
and, as part of consideration of business and assets of firm, assumes its debts
and liabilities, the promise to pay such debts is founded on sufficient considera-
tion, and firm creditor may maintain action against corporation, especially
when continued in same employment out of which debt arose. Lithographing
Co. v. Kerting, 809.
20. Several insurance companies united in resisting claims made on their
respective policies, and appointed a committee "wit
h full power and authority
to employ counsel and attorneys to appear for said companies and each thereof."
Each company was to pay its proportion of costs, fees and expenses, and com-
mittee was-authorized to make pro rata assessments. Held, that attorney em-
ployed by said committee could not hold companies jointly liable for his fees.
Ins. Co. v. Treadwell. 620.
21. Where plaintiff was misled by selectman of town into supposing that
notice of injuries receihed by him through insufficiency of highway, might be
given in thirty instead of twenty days, and gave the notice outside of the
twenty but within the thirty days; and at a legally warned meeting of voters of
town, plaintiff presented his claim, insisting that defect in notice could not be
taken advantage of, and thereupon town voted to pay him $200. Held, that
there was no consideration for vote. Gregg v. Town, 810.
22. Contract for employment of salesman for series of years, provided that
he should be paid for his services annually a sum equal to one-fifth of net
profits of business, which sum it was guaranteed should not be less than $7500.
The contract farther provided for deducting total expense and losses from gross
profits, for charging the house ten per cent. and interest on certain goods manu-
factured elsewhere, and that salesman was not to be regarded as partner. Held,
that in absence of special agreement or custom to contrary, employers could
not charge in expense account interest on temporary loans. Selz v. Bud, 281.
23. In such a case the compensation of salesman will not be estimated as
part of tha expenses to be deducted from the gross profits. Id.
COPYRIGHT. See INJUNCTION, 8.
CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 29. CONTRACT, 19. DEBTOn
AND CtEDITot, 2. EQUITY, 8. EVIDENCE, 4. LIBEL, 1. I[ASTER AND
SERVANT, 10. RAXLROAD. REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3, 4.
I. Can be sued for malicious prosecution. Boogher v. Association, 72.
2. May assign for benefit of creditors. Schockley v. Fisher, 72.
3. But insurance company, after it has violated insurance laws, cannot thus
withdraw itself from control of insurance department. Williams v. Ins. Co., 73.
4. Single stockholder can only sue to protect property of, after refusal of
directors so to do. City v. Dean, 216.
5. Volunteer fire company though chartered, had no stock, and its property
was acquired by donation. Only compensation of members was relief from
jury and militia duty. Member died, and fifteen years afterwards his heirs
claimed an interest in fund arising from sale of company's property. Held,
that they had no right to participate in fund, before, or after dissolution of cor-
poration. Jfason v. Fire Co., 216.
6. Corporation de jacto, trading and obtaining credit as such, is estopped
from denying its charter and name, especially after judgment. Ice Co. v.
Porter, 216.
7. Conversion of corporation defacto into one de jure, does not exempt pro-
perty held in latter character from liability to obligations of former. Id.
8. Private corporation, where creditors not affected, may in good faith and
without fraud, purchase its 'own stock, and hold, reissue or retire the same.
Clapp v. Peterson, 72.
9. Creditors of corporation have lien in equity on capital stock, which will
avail them except as against holders who have taken it bonafide for valuable
consideration, and without notice. Id.
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10. Creditor cannot hold as partners members of companywith which he has
dealt as corporation, both parties believing it to be so. Bank v. Padget, 143.
11. It must appear in record of judgment against foreign corporation which
has not appeared, that it was engaged in business in this state. St. Clair v.
Cox, 143.
12. Business corporations are liable for frauds and wrongs of agents, as
individual principals would be in like circumstances. Railroad Co. v. Bank,
750.
13. Sale to corporation may be rescinded where credit therefor was given
on strength of false and fraudulent contemporaneous representations of officers as
to its solvency and prosperity. , Cardy v. Rubber Co., 750.
14. Joint stock company has no inherent right to remove directors appointed
for definite period, before expiration thereof. Hotel Co. v. Hampson, 750.
15. If articles of association contain no power to remove directors before
expiration of period of office, but authorize shareholders, by special resolution,
to alter any of the articles, there must be special separate resolution altering
articles so as to give power to remove directors before resolution of removal
can be passed. Id.
16. Charter, read in connection with general laws, is measure of powers of
corporation, but whatever, under these, may fairly be regarded as incidental to
objects for which corporation is created, is not to be taken as prohibited.
Railroad Co. v. Steamboat Co., 281.
17. Charter of street railway company, silent as to character of motive
power, will be intended as giving right to use the kind most conducive to best
interests and safety of public, and, at time of passing charter, in ordinary use.
Railway Co. v. Town of Lake View, 417.
18. Where foreign corporations engage in business in state whose laws pro-
vide that they may be summoned by process served upon agent in charge
thereof, they are "found" in district where agent is doing business, within the
meaning of Act of Congress of March 3d 1875, and may be served in that
manner in suits brought in United States courts. .lcCoy v. Railroad Co.,
725.
19. Where shares of capital stock are issued to original subscribers as full
paid, and are sold as such, purchaser in good faith cannot be held liable to
creditor of corporation in value of stock, as for unpaid instalments. Brant v.
.Eden, 341.
20. Corporation may receive in payment of shares, any property which it
may lawfully purchase, and so long as transaction stands unimpeached for,fraud,
courts will treat as payment what parties have so regarded, and this, too, in
cases where rights of creditors are involved. Id.
2 1. By state statute, stockholders of corporation at its dissolution are liable
for its debts ; but it is provided that no person holding stock as collateral
security shall be so liable. Held, 1. That pledgees of the corporation are
within the exemption. 2. That certificates, absolute on their face, issued to
creditor as collateral or in trust, may be shown to be so held by evidence in
peis. 3. That voting on such stock does not estop holder from showing that
he only holds it as collateral. Burgess v. Seligman, S41.
22. The state court, after the transaction arose, and after the Circuit Court
had decided the case, made a contrary decision against same stockholders, hold-
ing that pledgees of the corporation were liable. Held, That U. S. Courts are
not bound to follow the decision of the state court. .d.
23. Agreement of one stockholder with another, in consideration of money,
to vote for certain person as manager, and for increase of salaries, is void,
unless assented to by all the stockholders ; whether valid, if so, quire ? Wood-
ruff v. Wentworth, 342.
24. Granting clause of deed, record of which was offered in evidence, was
as follows: "Know all men by these presents that the W. R. Land Company,
by S. H. president, and T. S. C. secretary, * * * has granted," &a. Attesta-
tion clause and signatures were: "In witness whereof, we hereunto subscribe
our names and affix our seals." Signed " S. H., president, (Scroll); T. S.
C., secretary (Scroll); W. K. Land Company (Scroll)." Certificate of ac-
knowledgment stated that S. R., president, and T. S. C., secretary, "ac-
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CORPORATION.knowledged that they executed and delivered the same as their voluntary act
and deed." Held, that one of seals would be presumed to be seal of corpora-
tion and that deed was deed of corporation. City of Kansas v. Railroad
Co., 684.
25. S. conveyed to C. certain property upon special trust to secure debts of
S., and subsequently transferred to C. his stock in Q. Co. as "pledge and
collateral security" to secure performance by S. of conditions of trust deed;
after breach of these conditions, C. filed bill in equity asking for receiver and
alleging mismanagement through which it had become impracticable to sell
stock pledged for sum commensurate with its value. Held, that C., as pledgee
of majority of stock for benefit of the S. creditors, was equitable creditor and
entitled to protection of court, and that the thing in litigation, was not the
stock itself but the property of the Q. Co. Chafee v. Quidnik Co., 545.
COSTS. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTR.TORS, I. JUDGMENT, 1.
CO-TENANTS. See ATTACHMENT, 5.
COUNTY. See MuNicIrA.t ConpoRATIOr.
COURTS. See INJUNCTION, 2. P_oniTiox, 1. RES A.JUDICATA.
It is present, not past interest that disqualifies a judge. Johnson v. Rail-
road, 545.
COVENANT. See DAMAGEs, 4.
1. Grantee by accepting deed becomes liable on covenants just as if he had
signed and sealed it. Sparkman v. Gore, 143.
2. Covenant bygrantee to assume mortgage for which grantor is liable binds
him to pay mortgage debt, and the damages recoverable are the ful amount of
debt, although not yet paid by plaintiff. Id.
3. Action may be maintained for breach of covenant against liability without
alleging or proving damage, but in covepant against damage because of liability,
such damage must be proved. Griswold v. Selleck, 545.
4. Agreement by purchaser of land to assume ineumbrance implies, at most,
a covenant of indemnity against damage resulting from breach. Id.
5. Agreement under seal between adjoining owners to build party wall,
when executed, gives to each an easement for support which passes by convey-
ance of premises. Roch v. Ullman. 73.
6. Conveyance was subject to "conditions" against erection of certain build-
ings. Held, that they were to be construed as restrictions, and constituted
breach of covenant against encumbrances in subsequent deed. Ayling v.
Kramer, 217.
CRIMINAL LAW. See BAIL. CONSTITUTIONAL Lxw, 21, 37. EnRORS AND
ArPEALS, 4. EXTRADITION. FALSE IMpRISOXMENT. INTOXICATING
tIQUORS, 2, 4-8. JURY, 1. PARENT AND CHILD. RE.IOVAL or CAUSES,
8. STATUTE, 4.
I. Generally.
1. Persons aiding or abetting should be indicted in same form as principals.
State v. Hessian, 143.
2. Onus of proving alibi is upon accused and it must be clearly established.
Garrity v. People, 811.
3. Burden of proof not changed by attempt to prove alht, and if by reason
thereof, jury entertain reasonable doubt, they should acquit, though not able to
find that alibi was fully proved. Walters v. State, 685.
4. Witness not the sole judge whether question may tend to criminate him;
court must see reasonable ground for apprehending danger. A&x arte Re -
nolds, 21, and note.
5. Where statute provides for both fine and imprisonment and one of penal-
ties is omitted, error will not afford ground of reversal. Dillon v. State, 217.
6. Under a statute making it an offence "to sell or give away," an indict-
ment charging that defendant " did sell and give away," is good. State v.
Pittman, 342.
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7. If defendant testify, his relation to the case may be considered by the
jury. State v. Sanders, 342.
8. The court may, but is not bound to, receive a verdict of guilty on one
count, without any finding as to the others. Jackson v. State, 342.
9. Parties to recognizance are presumed to know when and where term will
commence, and recognizance omitting the word " next" used in statute in
speaking of term, will not be invalid. Jedlick-a v. The State, 342.
10. Power of Supreme Court of the United States to review judgments in
criminal cases is limited to single question of power of lower court to commit
prisoner for act of which he has been convicted. Ex parte Curtis, 144.
11. Conviction in Mayor's court under municipal ordinance for disturbing
peace, will not protect against subsequent prosecution by state for assault
and battery, though same transaction be involved in both cases. De Graffen-
reid v. State, 751.
12. Where city policeman was slain, and mayor and council employed coun-
sel to prosecute slayer, this was not sufficient to disqualify all grand and tra-
verse jurors residing within corporate limits, on ground that they would be lia-
ble to taxation to satisfy attorney's fees. Doyal v. State, 546.
13. Person over sixty is not qualified juror; although such a one may not
have made known his age until jury was impaneled, he may then be excused,
although defendant may have exhausted all challenges but one in order to secure
such person on jury. Id.
14. Where defendant in criminal case, who had been convicted of misde-
meanor and sentenced to pay specified fine or serve ninety days in chain gang,
procured two others to give their promissory note in satisfaction thereof, and
such note was accepted by solicitor-general as equivalent of cash, consideration
was not illegal. Blaine v. Hitch, 546.
15. At common law only attorney-general could enter nolle pros. upon in-
dictment, and in New Jersey, there being no statute upon subject, power is still
reposed in attorney-general or several prosecutors of pleas ; bat, under long
established practice in this state, indictment after it passes under control of
court, may not be discharged without consent of court. State v. tickling, 546.
16. Peremptory power of court, where common law prevails, is never ex-
erted, upon representative of state to discharge indictment, in whole or in part,
at instance of parties. This can only be done where such power is conferred
upon court by statute. 1d.
17. Bonds on board a British ship lying in river and moored to shore at
Rotterdam were stolen, and prisoners, British subjects, were found dealing
with them in England, and were tried at Central Criminal Court and found
guilty of feloniously receiving the same knowing them to have been stolen.
Held, assuming bonds to have been stolen by foreigner or other person not
being one of crew, that admiralty had jurisdiction over the offence, and that
prisoners were properly tried in England. Begina v. Carr and Wilson, 299,
and note.
Ir. Burglary.
18. It is not indispensable to trace fruits of crime to possession of accused.
Garrity v. People, 811.
19. Finding of money, goods or other property, which were in house at
time of burglary, soon thereafter, in possession of person who is unable to ac-
count for his possession, raises a presumption of guilt and jury could convict
on this alone. Lundy v. State, 751.
III. Conspiracy.
20. Indictment charged conspiracy on part of two directors of national bank
to procure declaration of dividend with knowledge that bank had made no net
profits. Held, the declaration of dividend by association is not wilful misap-
plication of its funds by individual directors. It is act done by them as officers
and not in their individual capacity. There being no crime under sect. 5209
of Rev. Stat. U. S., there could be no valid indictment under sect. 5440.
United States v. Britton, 545.
IV. Larceny.
21. It is larceny to bring goods stolen in one state into another, bit the
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thief cannot be indicted in latter state for original theft. Worthington v.
State, 73.
V. Murder.
22. Homicidal mania must be proved by evidence which" fairly" preponder-
ates. Coyle v. Commonwealth, 191, and note.
23. An attempt at suicide is not of itself evidence of insanity. Id.
24. Where, at and before killing, there was a great riot by a mob which
accused took part in, incited and was in great part responsible for, he was
liable for each and every illegal act committed by such mob, and what was said
and done by mob or any of its members, was proper evidence on trial of de-
fendant. .dlcRue v. State, 751.
25. To justify homicide on the ground of self defence it must appear that it
was absolutely necessary to kill the deceased in the slayer's opinion, founded on
good reason; and also, either that deceased was the assailant or that slayer had
really endeavored to decline farther struggle before mortal blow. Heard v.
State, 342.
VI. Perjury.
26. Emolument returns and account for services rendered to United States,
of clerk of circuit and district court, sworn to before district judge, is " written
declaration" or "certificate," within meaning of sect. 5392 Rev. Stat. United
States v. Ambrose, 685.
27. Indictment against officer of national bank under sect. 5392) Rev. Stat.
U. S., for wilfully false declaration or statement in report made under sect.
5211, verified by oath, administered by notary public of state, prior to Act of
1881, cannot be sustained. United States v. Curtis, 546.
VII. Political assessments.
28. The Act of Congress of August 15th 1876, prohibiting political assess-
ments is constitutional. Ex parte Curtis, 144.
VIII. Sunday tippling.
29. It makes no difference in law whether place be called bar room, glee club,
parlor or restaurant, if liquor is retailed and tippled there on Sabbath day, with
door for entrance, so that anybody can enter and drink, proprietor is guilty of
keeping open tippling house on Sunday, and drinking may be done standing or
sitting, at bar or around the table. Hussey v. State, 217.
CROPS. See Sanunrp's SALE, 2.
CUST01. See F irrunas, 7. IsrmuxcE, 10, 12, 31. NUxsAncE, I.
CUSTOMS DUTIES. See UNITED STATEs, 2.
DAMAGES. See AD MItALT-r, 9; CosnxoU0 CaI .IrE, 16; LIBEL, I : MALI-
CIOUS PROSECUTION, 5 ; EGLIGENCE, 13; PRACTICE, I ; RAILROAD, 6, 7.
1. Sum of money in gross, to be paid for non-performance of contract is, as
general rule, to be considered as penalty and not liquidated damages. aSith
v. Wedgwood, 417.
2. True measure of, for breach of contract to sell and deliver fruit jars,
where part only were delivered, is difference between contract price and market
value at time and place fixed for delivery. If such articles can not be had in
market where they were to have been delivered, they may be bought in nearest
market and cost of transportation added. Capon v. De Steiqer Glass Co., 417.
3. Where contract contemplated an immediate shipment of press, and shipper
gave wrong directions as to timbers needed in setting it up, Held, that he was
liable for all damages resulting directly and naturally from his delay and
erroneous directions, but not for loss of custom. Dennis v. Stoughton, 810.
4. In covenant against grantor by grantee who had been evicted by para-
mount title, parties having agreed on value of land, and eviction having
occurred within period of limitation for actions of trespass, four years, and no
action for mense profits having been brought, Held, that plaintiff was entitled
to interest on agreed value for four years prior to entry of judgment. Iron
Works v. Turner, 547.
5. Grantor had been notified to defend ejeetment suit, but neither defended
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nor notified grantee that he would not doso. Held, that grantee should recover
his reasonable expenses and counsel fees in defending ejectment. Iron Works
v. Turner, 457.
6. Where article is purchased for shipment abroad, and the fact was shown on
face of contract, and known to vendor, and vendee could not discover in-
feriority of article fraudulently substituted by vendor's employees until it
reached its destination, measure of damages is difference between market price
of article contracted for, at date of arrival, and price realized upon sale, to-
gether with costs and expenses of sale. Oil Co. v. Sc/lens, 343.
7. In action by vendee against vendor such damages as are the natural and
proximate result of breach need not be particularly stated. Id.
8. In action for timber cut and carried away, measure of damages' is:
1. Where defendant is wilful trespasser, full value of property at time and place
of demand or suit brought. 2. Where defendant is unintentional trespasser, or
his innocent vendee, value at time of conversion, less *hat labor and expense
of defendant and his vendor have added. 3. Where defendant is purchaser,
without notice of wrong, from wilful trespasser, value at time of purchase.
W'ooden Ware Co. v. U. S., 677.
9. At trial of action of contract for breach of agreement to carry plaintiff
from S. to N., it appeared that he bought a proper ticket ; that conductor re-
fused to receive same, and, at intermediate station, being a railroad police offi-
cer, arrested plaintiff for evading his fare, and delivered him to police officers,
who detained him during the night. Held, that the detention, discomforts,
consequent illness, and indignities suffered at hands of police officers were not
elements of damage in this action. Afurdocl v. Railroad, 217.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See ASStGNMENT, 8, 10, 12. Izsu n cE, 22.
MUNICIPAL CoaronATiox, 18. TiuST AND TRuSTEE, 6.
1. In case of contract merely malum prohibitum value of property received
for unauthorized purpose may be recovered. City v. Brown, 281.
2. Certificates of membership in board of trade are not property and can
not be subjected to" payment of debts by creditor's bill. Barclay v. Smith,
435, and note.
3. Law only requires donee to take such possession as nature of property
admits of in order to protect it against attachment by creditors of donor. Ross
v. Draper, 811.
4. Statute of 13th Elizabeth, ch. 5, embraces creditors and "all others who
have cause of action, or suit, or any penalty or forfeiture, and embraces actions
of slander, trespass and other torts." Welde v. Scotten, 343.
5. Judgment creditor in action of trespass can attack conveyance of defendant
as fraudulent. Id.
6. A gift by husband to wife embracing all grantor's property will not be
held void, at least unless it is shown to be more than a reasonable provision.
Wood v. Broadley, 343.
7. Novation is substitution of one debtor for another, or substitution of new
obligation for old one which is thereby extinguished; the new contract must be
a valid one upon which creditor can have his remedy. Gaichard v. Brande,
620.
8. Payment, to constitute defence, must be of money or something accepted
in its stead. Valid obligation can not be paid or satisfied by transfer of forged
securities. .d.
9. To create estoppel by admission of payment it must appear that person
setting up estoppel was induced by admission to do something to his prejudice
if admission be withdrawn. Id.
10. Where difference between price paid and actual value is apparent and
great, conveyance will be regarded as voluntary to extent of difference.
Strong v. Lawrence, 144.
11. If debtor is insolvent when judgment is rendered, his insolvency will
be considered as extending back beyond voluntary conveyance made during his
indebtedness, unless contrary be shown. Id.
12. Conveyance byinsolvent to daughter-in-law, in consideration of amounts
owed as her guardian, is valid, and creditors can not compel him to set off
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amounts furnished by him for maintenance and support of her and her husband.
Comfort v. Bearden, 218.
13. A., treasurer of R. I. company and agent of Mass. company, and B.,
home agent of latter company, arranged to transfer accounts so that debt of A.
to Mass. company and one of B. to R. L company should be cancelled by B.
paying excess in cash. Before arrangement was consummated, A. received notice
that B.'s agency was revoked, and B. never completed arrangement by paying.
Eeld, that R. I. company could not sue A. for amount of B.'s debt to it less
amount of A.'s debt to Mass. company. Gas Burner Co. v. Barney, 547.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See ExecuToRs AND ADmINISTnATOnS.
DECEIT. See ACTION, 3.
DEED. See ConOptATioN, 24. COVENANT, 1. ESTOPPEL, 1. EVIDENCE, 17.
1. Grantdr may at any time revoke deed placed in hands of A. with direc-
tions to deliver it on grantor's death. Hale v. Joslin, 811.
2. Deed cannot be delivered to grantee or obligee as an escrow, to take effect
upon condition not appearing on its face ; the delivery must be to stranger. Mlc-
Cann v. Atherton, 621.
3. Deed signed by B. with A.'s name, in A.'s presence, and under A.'s
direction, is deed of A. Goodell v. Bates, 417.
4. If one whose name is signed by another to deed, so far acknowledges same
as to induce third persons to act on it as Lis, he may, without evidence in writ.
ing of an estoppel, be held precluded from subsequently denying the deed.
Id.
5. Granting clause conveyed "all the stone coal lying and being in, under
and upon certain premises," in consideration of thirty cents per ton on all coal
mined, and second party bound themselves to mine at least 3000 tons annually,
but had the right "to abandon the contract at any time." Beld, 1. All mine-
able coal passed to grantees. 2. No interest therein remained in grantor sub-
ject to be mortgaged as land. 3. A mortgage upon the remaining interest
of grantor did not cover purchase-money due or to become due from purchasers
of coal. Edwards v. McClurg, 344.
6. A. owning unimproved lot over which projected to extent of foot, eaves
of adjoining house owned by B., conveyed to B. by deed in execution of which
B. did not join, strip of land so overhung. Deed stipulated that it was made
and accepted upon express condition and reservation that A. and his heirs, or
owner of A.'s lot, should have right of building up to line of lot thereby con-
veyed, and of having two windows looking out on said lot "which windows
shall not be hindered or obstructed in any way by said B., his heirs or assigns,
to any other or greater extent than such windows if so erected could be obstruct-
ed by the house of B., at present standing on his said lot." Bld, that deed
only entitled A. to have unobstructed by buildings, for benefit of his windows,
the one foot strip conveyed by deed. Cooper v. Louanstein, 738, and note.
7. Per BEAsEIXY, C. J.-Deed not executed by grantee but accepted by
him containing grant of easement in lands of grantee, such lands not being
passed by conveyance, is not to be regarded with respect to grant of easement
as deed of grantee. Id.
DEMURRER. See FIXTURES, 2.
DESCENT. See WILL, 9.
DETAINER. See TRESPASS, 1.
DEVISE. See WILL.
DIVIDENDS. See INSURANCE, 32.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
DOMICILE.
1. In Constitution of Rhode Island, "residence" means domicile. hence
where citizen had domicile in town of L., but temporarily resided elsewhere, he
had right to vote in town of L. State v. Aldrich, 621
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2. Foreigner without parents, kept her trunks, &c., at her brother's house
in a certain county, and seemed to regard it as a home, returning there when
sick or out of employment. Held, that it was the county of her residence.
County v. County, 144.
3. Where it is shown that person resides at certain place at certain time,
ordinary presumption is that it was a continuing residence. How long such
presumption would last must depend on all the circumstances. Inhabitants of
Greenfield v. Inhabitants of Camden, 144.
4. Voting is not conclusive evidence of residence. The act and circum-
stances under which vote is given are for the consideration of the jury. In-
habitants of East Livermore v. Inhabitants of Farmington, 144.
DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS. Sep GIFT, 1.
A certificate of deposit payable to order was endorsed as follows: "Pay
to Martin Basket, of Henderson, Kentucky ; no one else ; 'then not till my
death. My life seems to be uncertain. I may live through this spell. Then
I will attend to it myself. H. M. Chancy." Chancy then delivered the cer-
tificate to Basket, and died. Held, not a valid donatio cause mortis. Basket
v. Hassell, 344.
DRUNKENNESS. See ARBITRATION.
DURESS.
1. Where party seeks relief from obligation of contract on ground of duress,
regard will be lad to age, sex and condition of life, and evidence is admissi-
ble to show that person subjected to duress had heard that person threatening
was of violent disposition. .Jordan v. Elliott, 181, and note.
2. Mere vexation and annoyance, leading to execution and acknowledgment
of conveyance in trust for grantor and his heirs, insufficient to establish such
duress as to avoid the deed, unless it be further shown that a state of insanity
was thereby produced. Brower v. Callender, 282.
3. Where agent of company had collected money and failed to return it, and
another agent demanded the amount and threatened prosecution unless it was
secured, and mortgage was given for same, Held, that if mortgage was given
to settle or suppress criminal prosecution, it could not be collected ; if given
to secure what defaulting agent owed, it could. Wheaton v. Ansley, 751.
EASEMENT. See DEED, 5, 6.
Where owner of entire estate sells a portion, purchaser takes with the bur-
den and benefits as they appear. Henry v. Koch, 394, and note. Ancient win-
dows. Id., note.
EJECTMENT. See DArAGE, 5. EQUITY, 1.
ELECTION. See PARTNERSHIP, 9.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
1. Court acting upon its own knowledge of commerce and business neces-
sities of county, must determine, upon facts stated in petition, whether the
land is reasonably necessary for purpose stated. Jury can find no fact except
what is just compensation. Smith v. Railroad. 481.
2. Every company seeking to condemn land for public improvement must,
in modified degree, be permitted to judge for itself as to amount necessary.
This right is subject to all constitutional and statutory restrictions, and to further
limitation that courts can prevent any abuse of same. Id.
ENCUINIBRANCE. See MORTGAGE.
EQUITY. See ACCOUNT. ASSIGNMENT, 8. BILLS AXD NOTES, 15. COieSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw, 15, 16. DEnTOR AND CREDITon, 2. bSURANCE, 3. Lini-
TATIONS, STATUTE OF, 12, 13, 14. NATIONAL BANns, 4. PAxTITION.
:PAurTxEnsHiP, 10, 11, 13, 14. TRUST, 1. WILL, 10.
1. Will not afford relief in proper cases for action of ejeetment. Cowman v
Colquhoun, 811.
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2. Cestui que trust can not proceed in, merely because his interest is equitable.
Guaranty and Indemnity Co. v. Water Co., 345.
3. Refusal of new trial can not be reviewed by bill in equity to enjoin pro-
ceedings on the judgment; nor will what should have been urged in favor of
the new trial, form good ground for such a bill. Embry v. Palmer, 345.
4. To reform contract for fraud or mistake equity must have fill proof of
same. Fessenden v. Oclington, 144.
5. One can not be both plaintiff and defendant in same suit at law ; in such
a case, remedy is by bill in equity. Hayden v. Whitmore, 282.
6. Bill in equity to enjoin trespass by felling timber, need not be brought in
county where land lies. Proper venue is county of defendant's residence.
Powell v. Ciesldre, 214.
7. Taxes on another's land paid under mistaken belief of ownership, can not
be recovered in equity. Railroad Co. v. Mathers, 73.
8. Two or more judgment creditors of corporation may unite in creditor's
bill against it and stockholders to reach unpaid subscriptions, and such a bill is
not multifarious. Rick-ling v. Wilson, 73.
9. Only interferes with action at law where there are equitable circumstances
which render it unjust, as against defendant at law, that suit should proceed.
Long Dock v. Bentley, 752.
10. Bill for discovery and payment into court lies against former sheriff
under act providing, that all fines imposed on persons convicted of keeping
houses of ill-fame, shall be divided equally between certain dispensaries of the
city. Snowden v. Dispensary, 751.
11. Issue of fact from court of equity to be tried by a jury is entirely in
discretion of court for informing its conscience, and is not binding upon it. It
should only be allowed where proof creates doubt, never as a substitute for
failuie of proof or omitted evidence. Chase v. Winans, 480.
12. Bill against several defendants to set aside several distinct conveyances,
made to them separately, on ground of fraud, one general right being claimed,
is not multifarious. Bobb v. Jobb, 480.
13. Under laws of Illinois party may only file bill to quiet title or remove
cloud from title to real property, when he is in possession thereof, or when he
claims to be owner, and lands are unimproved and unoccupied. Gould v.
Sternburg, 480.
14. Where one authorized by power of attorney to sell and convey lands,
conveys same without consideration, owner may treat such conveyance as
nullity: and having, therefore, an adequate remedy at law to recover possession
by action, cannot maintain equitable action to have grantee declared trustee and
for reconveyance. Campbell v. Campbell, 282.
15. A. filed bill to prevent B. obstructing strip of land between their estates
and houses, which originally belonged one-half to estate of each, but which had
become public way by fifty years' use. A. charged that only access to his back
door and yard was through the way over this strip. On demurrer: Held, 1.
That bill sufficiently charged special damage. 2. That it was maintainable to
enjoin B. from obstructing strip as private way, A.'s right not being affected
by public rights subsequently acquired. 3. That it was maintainable to
remove the nuisance, though complainant might have other remedies, and
though bill charged neither irreparable mischief nor right established at law.
Gorton v. Tiffany, 418.
16. By written agreement between S. and B., each agreed to convey land
to the other "subject to" an encumbrance. S. delivered to D. deed, conveying
land " subject to" encumbrance, and also containing elwase stating that E.
assumed and agreed to pay the encumbrance as part of consideration.
E., being ill, did not read clause, but discovered it after having made two pay-
ments of interest on encumbrances, and promptly brought suit to have deed
reformed. In negotiations prior to agreement S., through agent, had solicited
E. to assume encumbrance, but E. refused. S. understood difference between
two forms of expression. Owner of encumbrance was no party to transaction,
and had done nothing in reliance upon deed. Held, That agreement created
no liability on part of E. to pay debt to D., that there was a mutual mistake in
the deed and B. was entitled to have it reformed. Elliot v. Sackett, 685.
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17. A., who was of improvident habits and unskilled in affairs, applied to
B., real estate and mortgage broker, to procure a loan, having previously had
loans from him. B. prolonged negotiations for month, objecting to security
offered, which was undivided interest worth some $10,000, in inherited realty,
and finally loaned A. $2000 instead of $1000, sum originally requested, taking
from A. note for payment of $2000, six mouths after date, with interest at five
per cent. per month, payable monthly in advance till said principal sum is paid,
and all instalments of interest to carry interest at same rate till paid. When
transaction took place statute allowed parties to make their own agreement as
to interest, prescribing six per cent. in absence of agreement. Be/d, That B.
had taken unconscionable advantage, and that case should be referred to master
to fix reasonable rate of interest not less than six per cent. Brwn v. Hall,
686.
18. Bill was brought to enjoin action at law, because 1. Execution was on
satisfied judgment. 2. Judgment creditor was guilty of laches in delaying to
bring action. 3. Action was maliciously brought to harass and oppress.
Demurrer thereto sustained. Clark v. Clapp, 686.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See ADMIRALTY, 3, 7. CRnIINAL LAw, 10.
PuRCTion, 4. REMOVAL oF CAUSES, 1.
1. Point not raised in court below will not be considered on appeal. Wet-
more v. Mlellinger, 711.
2. Refusal of District Com to grant certificate of probable cause in revenue
prosecution, where judgment is for claimant, is not reviewable. United States
v. Ferrick, 145.
3. Appeal will not lie from interlocutory order, as from order refusing to
allow one to become party defendant to bill. Young v. Zinc Co., 282.
4. Where convict escapes pending a writ of error, it is within discretion of
court to hear cause while he is at large. M cGowan v. People, 74.
5. Although appellant in court below claimed $3000, yez as he was there
awarded $1500, matter in dispute in Supreme Court United States, required
to be $2500, was but $1500. Rilton v. Dickinson, 752.
6. Decree is final for purpose of appeal, when it terminates litigation on
merits, and leaves nothing to be done but enforcement by execution. Railway
Co. v. Express Co., 752.
7. Administrator may maintain appeal from order of payment on ground
that it lays down rule of apportionment which works injustice as between
creditors of estate. Estate of HcCune , 481.
8. The obtaining possession of a share of the estate without further delay or
litigation is sufficient consideration for waiver of appeal from decree construing
will. Mackey v. Daniel, 481.
9. Where several persons with distinct interests join in libel, the aggregate
of sums awarded is not to be considered in determining appellate jurisdiction.
In re Railroad Co., 73.
10. Appeal to Supreme Court United States, where there is evidence in
record to sustain jurisdiction, will not be dismissed simply because upon ex-
amination of all affidavits court may be of opinion that estimates of value of
matter in dispute acted upon below were too high. Gage v. Pampelly, 621.
11. County officer subpoenaed cashier of National Bank to appear before
him with his books, &c., in matter relating to tax lists. Bank filed bill in
equity to enjoin auditor, which Circuit Court dismissed and bank appealed.
Held, that appeal must be dismissed on ground that amount in controversy
did not exceed $5000. Bank v. Hughes, 548.
12. Payee of two notes given in single contract brought separate actions
thereon, in each of which maker interposed same counterclaim. In one,
demurrer to the counterclaim was sustained, and after final judgment and writ
of error, defendant prosecuted his counterclaim in other suit and accepted
agreed amount therefor. These facts being by leave brought into record,
Held, 1. That such facts occurring since final judgment may be pleaded in
appellate court. 2. That foregoing facts are in legal effect a withdrawal of
the counter claim. 3fatthews v. Davis, 345.
VOL. X=XI.-106
842 INDEX.
ESCROW. See DEED, 1.
ESTOPPEL. See CORPORATION, 4, 21. DEBTOR .AND CREDITOR, 9. DEED,
2. FOnmER RECOvERY, 4. INSURANson, 23. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 7.
1. Recital in deed does not estop grantee from showing real consideration.
Wood v. Broadley, 345.
2. Mere knowledge that one is about to purchase, does not impose on own6r
of equity duty of seeking him out and advising against it. Bramble v. Kings-
bury, 418.
3. Blank assignment of certificates of stock with blank power of attorney to
transfer on books of company, enables holder, as to persons dealing with him
without notice of any defect of power in him, to use them as owner might,
though legal title may not have passed, for want of transfer on books of
corporation. Otis v. Gardner, 481.
EVIDENCE. See ADIIRALTY, I. BILLS AND NOTES, 8. CONTRACT, 16.
CRIIINAL LAW, 4, 19, 22, 24. DURESS, 1. GIPT, 2. INTOXICATING
LiQuons, 7. LIBEL, 2, 4-6. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 1, 2. PATENT,
3. TRIAL, 5. WILL, 3, 4.
1. Any one can express opinion as to speed of railway train. Railroad Co.
v. Johnson, 117.
2. Conversation between parties to written contract, after execution and de-
livery, relating to change of some provisions, admissible. Oakland ice Co. v.
M31axcy, 418.
3. Books of science not admissible to prove opinion contained therein, but
maybe received to contradict witness who has referred to them as authority.
Pinney v. Cahill, 104, and note.
4. Medical books can not be introduced in evidence, npr can expert testify
as to statements made therein, nor can they be read to jury by counsel. Boyle
v. State, 621.
5. Extracts from standard work on mechanics may be read to jury in action
on the case to recover for injury caused by use of defective machinery. Bolling
Mills v. Monka, 811.
6. Rule that witness not an expert can not testify as to his opinion, not of
universal application; under certain circumstances, such witness may state his
observation as to cause and effect. Yahn v. City, 644, and note.
7. Declaration of president of canal company about time of construction,
under his direction, of certain work for use of canal, with regard to purpose of
company in building it, competent evidence against company. Halsey v.
Railroad Co., 548.* 8. Declaration respecting management of section of canal, made by super-
visor in response to complaint concerning his management, also competent. Id.
9. Court can not allow party to impeach his own witness by general evidence
or proof of prior contradictory statements. Cox v. Eayres, 621.
10. When deposition was excluded because witness was in court, and wit-
ness was then called, and on cross-examination testified that plaintiff about
time of taking deposition, had given him shoes and liquor, Held, that plain-
tiff could repel imputation cast upon him, but could not show that witness had
made prior contradictory statements. Id.
11. When witness is party to action court may, probably, in its discretion,
allow broader range of cross-examination than in ordinary cases; but such
latitude is not a right of adverse party. Norris v. Cargill, 547.
12. One who accepts employment to perform skilled labor impliedly under-
takes that he possesses requisite skill, and in action for breach of contract, evi-
dence that he represented himself as possessed of such skill is iminaterial. Id.
13. In action for price of goods sold, upon issue whether plaintiff sent bill
by mail to defendant and defendant received it, evidence is admissible that
upon envelope was printed usual request to return, and that it was not re-
turned. Heddon v. Roberts, 686.
14. If, in action of tort against two defendants, one calls other as witness,
he cannot, before credibility of witness has been attacked, put in evidence that
witness was without means to satisfy judgment that might be obtained against
him. Bryant v. Zidgewell, 218.
15. In suit by physician to recover for services, where only testimony as to
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their value and propriety of treatment is opinion of other physicians, it is
error to instruct jury that they may disregard this opinion. Wood v. Bark-er,
323, and note.
16. Opinion evidence generally. Id., note.
17. Before office copy can be introduced, execution and genuineness of origi-
nal deed must be proved, and that all apparent means to produce the same
have been exhausted. Elwell v. Cunningham, 145.
18. Evidence of what one joint maker said when he delivered note to plain-
tiff about signing thereof by defendant, other joint-maker, inadmissible.
Smith v. Wagaman, 145.
19. In civil action where defence rests upon an alleged crime, plaintiff's
guilt need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. .Behrens v. Ins. Co.,
145.
20. The quality of goods furnished can be shown by evidence of the quality
of articles of same kind and quality furnished at same time to another party.
Ames v. Quimby, 145.
21. The exceptions to rule that written contract shall be only evidence are,
1. Where writing is on its face incomplete. 2. Where parties in negotiating
agreement have entered into another agreement by parol, collateral and on
distinct subject. Naumberg v. Young, 145.
22. To justify admission of parol promise, made during negotiation of writ-
ten contract, on the ground that it was collateral, it must relate to subject dis-
tinct from that of written contract. Morgan v. Griffith, 145.
EXECUTION. See ATTACHMENT, 11. SHERIFF, 3. SHEnIFF'S SALE, 1.
1. No entry necessary to constitutdvalid levy on real estate. Morgan v.
Kinney, 218.
2. Property in legal controversy cannot be seized by other judicial power
than that under which it came into custody of law. Ppher v. .Foredyce, 665,
and note.
3. One partner, with consent of others, may claim separate exemption out
of partnership property seized on execution against firm. 0' German v. lnk,
621.
4. Consent of partners that each should have and select an exemption out of
partnership property, after levy, amounts to severance of joint property, and
the several right of each attaches to portion he selects. A demand by each for
such exemption will be deemed consent that others have same. Id.
S. In such case there is sufficient demand if partner informs officer making
levy that he claims exemption and that other partners do the same, and asks
permission to make selection, Id.
6. On judgment against married woman, sheriff seized her household furni-
ture, &e. She was living with her husband, who was insolvent and contributed
but little to family's support, and she had for several years almost entirely
maintained him and her children. Held, that her right to claim exemption as
C1 a debtor having a family residing in this state," not being clear, she was not
entitled to injunction restraining sheriff from selling. Muir v. Howell, 752.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See ACCOUNT. EnoaS AND
APPEALS, 7. JUDICIAL SALE. LI"ITATIONs, STATUTE Ov, 4. P'ARTNER-
SHIP, 5. SURETY, 2, 3.
1. Expenses of defending will which is set aside must be borne by the devi-
sees whose interests are at stake. 9iTzaw v. Moderwel, 74.
2. Errors in accounts of, open to correction in all subsequent accounts, except
matters disputed and determined, which cannot be again questioned without
leave of court. Watts v. Watts, 74.
3. Executor not liable for failure of banks in whieh he had deposited estate
funds in his own name, adding "estate of Hassel C. Jacobus," his testator,
bank being in excellent standing at time of deposit. Jacobus v. Jacobus,
752.
4. When debt due to decedent is voluntarily paid by debtor at his own dom-
icile in state in which no admininistration has been taken out, and in which no
creditors or next of kin reside, to administrator appointed in another state, and
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sum paid is inventoried and accounted for by him in that state, payment is good
as against administrator afterwards appointed in state where payment is made,
although this is state of decedent's domicile. Wilkins v. JElIlct, 417
EXECUTORY DEVISE. See WILL, 7.
EXEMPTION. See EXECUTION, 3-6. PARTNEnsmIr, 4. PExsioN, 2. UNITED
STATES, 1.
EXPERT. See EVIDENCE, 6.
EXTRADITION. See Pnocrss, 2.
1. Person extradited under treaty of 1842 with Great Britain, cannot be de-
tained and prosecuted for different crime than one specified in warrant of
extradition. State v. Vanderpool, 686.
2. Provisions of this treaty are part of law of land, enforceable by judicial
tribunals of state in behalf of person so detained and prosecuted. Id.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
1. Duty of person making or causing arrest, to convey party without delay
before most convenient officer authorized to receive affidavit and issue warrant.*
This duty not discharged by delivering party to police officer: imprisonment under
such arrest not legal beyond reasonable time for procuring warrant; what
constitutes reasonable time, question for jury. Steamship Co. v. Williams,
218.
2. Object of arrest is to carry prisoner before magistrate. After warrant
issued and arrest, reasonable time will be allowed by magistrate for making
investigation and procuring evidence. Id.
FIXTURE.
1: Whether building erected on land of another with his permission, is
realty, is question of fact depending on intention of parties. Pope v. Skinile,
548.
2. Averment in pleading that building erected as dwelling-house is personalty,
is issuable, and is confessed by demurrer. .cd.
3. Pleading false on its face in essential allegation is bad on demurrer. Id.
4. Portable iron furnace standing on cellar floor and held in position by its
own weight, and capable of being detached, with its pipes, &e., without injury
to building, is not, as between mortgagor and mortgagee, a fixture. alaway
Sav. Inst. v. (lurch, 283.
5. Machine with iron legs screwed to floor, of great weight, connected with
shafting and adapted and necessary for business, but -which can be moved with-
out injury, not covered by mortgage of land. Hubbell v. Bank, 74.
6. Whether chattel becomes fixture, does not depend so much upon character
of fastening as upon nature of article and its use. As between mortgagor and
mortgagee tests are: 1. Real or constructive annexation of article. 2.
Appropriation or adaptation to use or purpose of part of realty with which it
is connected. 3. Intention of party making annexation. Thomas v. Davis
482.
7. As between landlord and tenant, evidence of custom with respect to
chattels annexed to realty, by which they are treated as personalty, is admis-
sible, but not so as to articles annexed by mortgagor or grantor before convey-
ance. Id.
8. Fixtures annexed by tenant are not chattels, unless made so by tenant's
severance, or for benefit of his execution creditors. Darrah v. Baird, 532,
and note.
9. Trover does not lie for fixtures attached by tenant, and remaining annexed
to freehold, against owner of land, who has taken possession of premises. Id.
10. Agreement between landlord and tenant that latter may remove fixtures
at end of term, does not permit him to do so thereafter. Id.
11. In action to recover value of certain shelving and counters, Held, That
under evidence and instructions of court in this case, the verdict necessarily
established, 1. That relation of landlord and tenant never existed between
parties. 2. That shelving and drawers were erected and placed in defend-
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ant's building by plaintiff under license from defendant, and under agreement
that plaintiff might remove same at pleasure, and hence that they preserved
their character as personal chattels of plaintiff; and further, that being capable
of being severed and removed without material injury to building, action for
their wrongful conversion will lie against defendant, after demand upon him for
permission to remove same, and refusal on his part, although still attached to
building. Stout v. Stoppel, 536, and note.
12. Wooden platform was erected for trade purposes, in defendant's building,
by tenant who assigned to plaintiff for benefit of creditors. Plaintiff, with
defendant's consent, assigned term to third party, but reserved platform and
right to enter and remove it. Upon entering for that purpose within reasonable
time, defendant claimed to own platform, and threatened to have plaintiff
arrested for stealing if he removed it. Held, That action lay against defendant
for wrongfiul conversion of platform, notwithstanding it was still annexed to
building. Shaperia v. Barry, 538, and note.
FORCIBLE ENTRY.
Where statute gives to person unlawfully in possession right of action for
forcible entry by true owner, that remedy is exclusive, and trespass cannot be
maintained. Canavan v. Gray, 718, and note.
FOREIGN CORPORATION. See CORPORATION, 18.
FORFEITURE. See IssuA cn, 3, 4. SALE, 4.
FORMER RECOVERY.
1. Judgment against surviving member of firm does not conclude representa-
tives of deceased partner. BucLngham v. Ludlow, 753.
2. In action on bond conditioned for payment of sum in five annual instal-
ments, confession of judgment for four is no bar to action for fifth subsequently
falling due. AlM v. Ahl, 812.
3. Where facts claimed to afford a defence are sufficient to constitute counter
claim, defendant is not bound to set them up. Witte v. Lodwood, 482.
4. Defendant relying solely on legal title, in action to recover possession of
real property, and failing, is not estopped to maintain action to correct mis-
takes in deeds under which parties to such action respectively claimed. He
has his election to rely on such equitable title as defence or counter claim, or
may maintain action thereon. Id.
5. Where party has choice between two actions on same demand, and selects
one, which is decided by competent tribunal, either for or against him, as gen-
eral rule he will not be permitted to resort to other. Walsh v. Canal Co., 482.
FRAUD. See ACTION, 2. ASSIGNMENT, 2. COrOnRATON, 13. DEBTOR AND
CREDITOB, 5, 6. NATIONAL BANKS, 3. PARDON. VENDOR AND VEN-
DEE, 4.
1. Party who can make out his case without introducing into it fraud in
which his opponent and himself participated, will obtain relief in spite of
effort on part of opponent by plea or offer of proof to set up such fraud.
Chaffee v. Sprague, 687.
2. As between original parties, when one has been guilty of intentional and
deliberate fraud, by which to his knowledge other has been misled, that fraud
might have been discovered by reasonable care and diligence is no answer.
Livington v. Strong, 812.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See TRUST AN) TRUSTE, 1,
1. Written memorandum required by 17th section need not be delivered.
Drury v. Young, 74.
2. Place of signature immaterial; name may be printed. Id.
3. Person rendering services under contract invalid by, may recover their
value in action on quantum ineruit. Budingham v. Ludlow, 753.
4. Oral guaranty of payment of note of third person, given in payment of
debt of guarantor, is within statute, even if principal object is payment of
guarantor's own debt. Dows v. Swat, 687.
5. Contractors agreed with merchants to pay orders and time checks issued
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by. sub-contractor. The merchants gave credit exclusively to contractors.
Held, That promise was not within statute. Best v. O'Hara, 146.
6. Defendant promised that if plaintiff would attend sale to be made under
deed of trust given to secure note of third person held by plaintiff, and would
buy in property for defendant, he would pay plaintiff the amount of note.
Held, that promise was not within the statute. Hale v. Stuart, 346.
7. Where debtor, creditor and third person, who owed debtor, came together
and agreed that third person should pay creditor, and debtor was released, con-
tract was not within the statue. Howedl v. Field, 346.
GARNISHMENT. See ATTACHMENT.
GIFT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 3. LEGACY, 3.
I. To support donatio cause mortis there must be delivery of subject by
donor as a gift, such as, in case of gift inter vivas, would invest donee with
title. 2AcCord v. Mc Cord, 687.
2. Where bonds are delivered under express promise in writing to return
same " whenever called for," the terms and conditions of writing cannot be
varied by parol, and such undertaking is entirely incompatible with absolute
gift; but no duty to return will arise until demand, and statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run until then. Selleck v. Setleck, 812.
3. Intestate, shortly before her death, gave promissory note to plaintiff, who
was daughter of intestate's husband by former marriage. Daughter worked
for father for some time after majority, but no contract for pay was proved.
Father, by third person, conveyed homestead to intestate. Referee stated as
fact that they designed and often talked between themselves that plaintiff should
be paid; that father so expressed his wish when he conveyed homestead, and
it was to carry out this purpose that note was given. Held, that there was no
declaration of trust, no legal consideration for note, and as gift, it rested in
promise, not executed. Rogers v. Rogers, 622.
GUARANTY.-
Guaranty indorsed upon note is absolute contract for payment at maturity
upon default of maker, and guarantor will be liable, although guarantee failed
to enforce lien upon personal property by which note was secured, until security
became lost and maker insolvent. Adams, 4-c., v. Tomlinson, 146.
GUARDIAN AND WARD. See AsSIGNsENT, 7. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 9.
Mere delay of ward on coming of age to compel guardian to settle accounts
in probate court, does not discharge sureties, notwithstanding guardian may, in
meantime, have become insolvent. Newton v. Haammond, 219.
HIGHWAY.
1. Abandonment of, by non-user does not work a forfeiture: a formal order
of the proper authorities is necessary. .Jones v. Williams, 346.
2. W., a butcher, bought an ox at S. market. While his drovers were
driving the ox through streets of S., it became unmanageable, and, without
negligence on part of drovers, rushed into T.'s shop and caused certain damage.
Held, that W. was not liable. Tillett v. Ward, 245, and note.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See CONFLICT OF LAws, 1, 8. DEnTOR AND
CREDITOR, 6. EXECUTION, 6. REPLEvIN, 5. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 6.
I. Divorce and Alimony.
1. Where wife has sufficient separate property she is not entitled to tempo-
rary alimony or expenses in a divorce suit. Westerfield v. Westerfield, 283.
2. Divorce suit abates by death of either party before decree: and this effect
-extends to whatever is identified with the proceedings. .3fcCurley v. MeCurley,
812.
3. Wife has right, independently of merits of .case, to require husband, when
she is living apart from him, and without means of her own, to defray expen-
ses of prosecuting her suit for divorce, court exercising discretion as to when
and to what extent allowances shall be granted. Id.
4. Jurisdiction exercised in divorce suit with respect to custody of children
is continuing, and order may be modified at any time during minority, without
reservation of such power in original order. Nreil v. Neil, 219.
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5. Jurisdiction to award alimony in divorce proceedings is purely statutory.
Hence judgment for alimony made without reserve, where time for new trial
has elapsed and there is no statutory provision for modifying judgment, cannot
be changed. Sammis v. Medbury, 687.
II. Separate Estate.
6. Conveyance to a married woman's separate use does not bar curtesy ex-
cept where there is a clear intent: trustee's covenant to convey at her death to
her appointees or heirs, held, not to indicate such an intention. Tremmel v.
.Kleiboldt, 75.
7. Husband can not pay debts with wife's separate money, and if creditor
knowingly receives such, wife may recoVer. If invested by creditor in realty
and husband insolvent, she may enforce a lien in equity. M31addox v. Oxford,
346.
8. In such a case it was a proper subject of equitable set-off that husband
held bond for titles from creditor more than amount of wife's fund invested in
the land, and tlat she subsisted on rents, &c., of the land. Id.
9. SOaE POINTS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND A.EnIc"
LEGISLATION, AS TO MARRIED WOMEN'S PPOPERTY. 761.
III. Contracts, Conveyances, 6-c.
10. Contracts of feme covert are, by common law, void. M3usicc v. Dobson,
52, and note.
11. Mere moral obligation is not sufficient consideration to support promise,
unless there is some antecedent legal liability. Therefore moral obligation of
married woman, created by her agreement while covert, will not support a new
promise made after coverture is ended, or make subsequent husband liable for
debt. Id.
12. Purchase of land in wife's name is presumptively for her benefit: but
presumption may be rebutted. Johnson v. Turner, 220.
.13. Husband may ratify contract for necessaries furnished to wife on his
credit, by promise to pay. Conrad v. Abbott, 75.
14. Wife's earnings, unless in independent business, cannot be basis of
claim against husband to prejudice of his creditors. Triplet v. Graham, 146.
15. "Irrevocable power of attorney" to collect rents, given as security for
loan, is between parties an equitable mortgage of rents, and when executed by
married woman and acknowledged in statutory form, is valid against her.
Joseph Smith Co. v. AleGuinness, 418.
16. Where lien for purchase-money is reserved in deed for land purchased
by married woman with her husband's consent, it may be enforced, though
notes given be void against woman personally. Bedford v. Burton, 75.
17. In such a case, woman can not rescind sale, nor will she or her husband
be allowed for permanent improvements. Id.
18. In such a case where interest above ordinary legal rate may be, and has
been stipulated for, it may be recovered. Id.
19. Married woman purchases land, pays part cash and in deed, "assumes
* * * as part of the purchase-money" a mortgage debt. This was only
separate property she possessed. She conveyed to F. and he to defendants by
like deeds. Upon foreclosure, proceeds were insufficient to pay debt. Held,
that aside from disability of coverture, acceptance by married woman of the
deed was an agreement to pay mortgage debt as part of consideration. The
transaction was not a purchase of equity of redemption. State v. Casey, 219.
20. Married woman may convey her separate property, her husband joining,
and stipulate for such terms of payment as she may think best. Id.
21. Defendants as grantees of F., were liable to mortgagee for deficiency,
but, in such action, it is a good defence to show, that before plaintiff has as-
sented to, or acted on promise in his favor, the agreement has been rescinded. Id.
INCUMBRANCE. See MORTGAGE.
INFANT. See INTOXICATING LiQuo s, 4, 5. NEGLIGENCE, 9, 11. REPLEYIN,
5. TRovnn, 1. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 4.
1. Plaintiff must show that goods purchased by, were necessaries, notwith-
INDEX.
INFANT.
standing defendant assumes burden of showing them not to be so. Wood v.
Losey, 605, and note.
2. Infant sued for price of horse, showed that his sole business was to carry
on mother-in-law's farm for share of produce, and that she was to furnish all
teams, tools and implements. Held, that this showed horse not to be a " neces-
sary," and that it was in error to give jury to understand that it was necessity
of horse to the farming business, instead of to his part in it, that fixed liability.
Id.
3. General principles applicable where question of necessaries is involved.
d., note.
4. When court can pronounce contract of infant to be to his prejudice, it is
void, when to his benefit, as for necessaries, it is good ; and when contract is
of uncertain nature, it is voidable only at election of infant. Green v.
Wilding, 271, and note.
5. Conveyance of land by infant for money consideration, not shown to have
been inadequate, is voidable at election of infant within reasonable time after
attaining majority. Id.
6. Where infant is upon platform of railroad station, not as passenger or
upon any business connected with railroad company, if injured bypassing train
he cannot recover on theory that company has failed to discharge toward him a
legal duty. Railroad Co. v. Schwindling, 453, and note.
7. Seale, that in such case company would only be liable for wanton or
intentional injury. Id.
INJUNCTION. See ASSIGNMENT, 11. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 35. EQUITY,
15. EXECUTION, 6. NUISANCE, 1. PARTNERSHIP, 18. RAILROADS, 3, 9,
10. TAxEs, 6. TRADEMARK, 1. WATEES AND WATERCOURSES, 3.
1. Where injury is irreparable, equity will interfere by injunction; and, if
necessary, after injury commenced, may compel, by mandatory injunction,
restoration of property to original condition. Hfenry v. Koch, 394,and note.
2. Court may punish party for wilful violation of injunctional order, not-
withstanding same ought not to have been granted; but it may not, in such
case, order party disobeying to pay any sum as indemnity to opposite party.
Koeder v. Dobberpuml, 283.
3. One against whom injunction is issued upoh an ex parte application, does
not forfeit his legal right to a hearing by violating the injunction. Id.
4. To have nuisance abated by, party must show that injury complained of,
is such, in its nature and extent, as to call far interposition of court of equity,
and that the right on which he grounds his title to relief is clear. Stanford v.
Lyon, 753.
5. Mandatory injunction is awarded as of course, wherever it is necessary
and appropriate process for carrying decree into effect. Id.
6. Will not lie to prevent simple trespass, consisting of single act, where per-
son committing or threatening trespass is able to respond in damages; but if
insolvent, and trespasses of grave character are threatened to be repeated, equity
will interfere to prevent wrong by restraining threatened trespass. Owens v.
Crossett, 419.
7. Trustees of Methodist Episcopal church can be compelled by mandatory
injunction to open church building closed by them against the duly appointed
preacher, on ground that it was not for interest of church that he be pastor, and
that he was appointed against wish of majority of members. Whitcar v. Mich-
enor, 753.
8. Representation of dramatic work which proprietor hag never copyrighted
or caused to be printed, if made without license, may be restrained by injunc-
tion, although such representation is from copy obtained by spectator attending
public representation by proprietor for money, and afterwards writing it from
memory. Tompkins v. Hallec, 220
INSANITY. See IN-suzRA E, 27, 28.
INSOLVENCY. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 22-25.
1. Discharge no bar to action by creditor not a party to proceedings, who is
citizen of another state. Hill v. Carlton, 146.
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2. Discharge under insolvent law does not bar debt contracted before its pas-
sage, the creditor in no way becoming party to insolvency proceedings. Conway
v. Seamons, 622.
3. Nor is such debt discharged though merged in judgment rendered after
passage of act. Id.
4. Law discharging such debt is unconstitutional. Id.
5. Maine insolvent law of 1878 was valid when enacted, though operation
was suspended by U. S. bankrupt law then existing. When repeal of bankrupt
law took effect insolvent law went into operation, and took cognisance of all
acts within its provisions done while it was so suspended, and applied to contracts
made during that time. Palmer v. Sixon, 419.
INSPECTION. See CO STnTUTnoItL LAW, 22.
INSURANCE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 36. Couro=tioN, 3. PAnTiEn-
snip, 12. PLEADING, 4.
I. Generally.
1. Law providing penalty against agent of foreign insurance company for
acting without certificate of authority from auditor showing company's compli-
ance with act, and declaring that any person aiding in transacting insurance bus-
iness of such company shall be subject to such penalty is constitutional and
valid. Pierce v. People, 622.
2. Defendant in this case regarded as agent of company, notwithstanding
clause in policy providing that any person, other than the assured, who shall
participate in any transaction concerning the insurance, will be deemed agent
of assured. .d.
II. L fe.
3. Where company refuses to receive premium on life policy, on ground of
lapse of policy by reason of non-payment on day stipulated, and assured claims
that company has waived right to assert forfeiture, equity has power to deter-
mine and enforce rights of parties. Insurance Co. v. Tullidge, 688.
4. Although policy and renewal receipts may contain stipulation that agents
of company shall not have authority to waive forfeitures where premiums have
not been paid on or before day designated, yet course of business between agent,
assured and company in giving effect to payments made when overdue, may pre-
clude company from objecting to payment tendered when overdue, where no
notice has been given. Id.
5. Under accident policy, providing that no claim shall be made where death
or injury may have happened in consequence of exposure to obvious or unne-
cessary danger, and containing condition that assured is required to use all due
diligence for personal safety and protection, no recovery can be had for death
of assured, caused by his being struck by railroad train, while running along
tracks in front of it in night time, to get on train approaching in opposite direc-
tion on parallel track. Tattle v. Ins. Co., 688.
6. Person may insure his own life and make policy payable to person without
interest therein. Hence, where policy was taken out on life of one and made
payable to another (who had no legal interest in it) in case he survived the
assured, and there was strong evidence to show that transaction was a wager,
Held, that it was for jury to say whether policy was obtained in good faith.
Langdon v. Insurance Co., 385, and note.
7. Applicant was asked : "Has any application ever been made, either to
this or any other company, upon which a policy was not issued ?" Held, that
negative answer was not improper, although application made to another com-
pany had not been finally passed on. Id.
8. Applicant made full statement regarding name of his usual medical
attendant to sub-agent, who, putting his own construction on the facts, filled in
the wrong name. Held, that company could not take advantage of the mis-
take. Id.
9. What is insurable interest. Assignment to person without. Id., note.
10. If dealings of insurance company with insured and other policy holders
are such as to induce belief that payment of premium within reasonable period
VOL. XXXI.-107
INDEX.
INSURANCE.
after day fixed will save a forfeiture, company cannot forfeit policy of one who
acted on that belief and subsequently made or tendered payment. Insurance
Co. v. Doster, 60.
11. Clause declaring that agents cannot receive overdue premiums or waive
forfeitures, cannot be set up where company habitually send renewal receipts to
its agent, leaving their use to his judgment, and he, with knowledge of com-
pany, receives premiums several days after they are due, and insured, relying
on such practice, tenders the premium within a reasonable time after it is
due. Id.
12. Where it had been invariable custom of company to send insured state-
ment of the premium due after deducting dividend, with notice when, where
and to whom same could be paid, and on account of a failure to send such
notice premium was not paid when due but was tende:ed within reasonable
time afterward, policy does not lapse. Id.
13. Semble, Where premium is liable to be reduced by dividends, company
should give insured reasonable notice of amount of dividends and thereby of
cash to be paid to keep policy alive. Id.
14. When person not sole beneficial owner, pays premium to keep up policy
of life insurance, he is entitled to lien in following cases only: 1. By contract
with beneficial owner. 2. By reason of right of trustees to indemnity out of
trust property for money expended in its preservation. 3. By subrogation to
their right of some person who at request of trustees, has advanced money for
that purpose. 4. By reason of right of mortgagee to add to his charge any
money paid to preserve property. In re Leslie, 753.
15. If application for policy provides that representations and answers
therein "shall form the basis and become part of the contract of insurance"
and "that any untrue answers will render the policy null and void," and
policy recites that it is issued "in consideration of the representations and
agreements in the application for this policy, which application is referred to
and made a part of this contract," in an action upon policy, application is to
be considered part of contract, and if representations in it are in a material
respect untrue, action cannot be maintained, though untrue representations
were inserted by agent employed by defendant to solicit insurance, without
knowledge of applicant, who orally stated truth to agent. McCoy v. Insurance
Co., 220.
III. l're.
16. Consignee of goods damaged in transit, has no right to abandon
them to insurance company and claim whole insurance, except in case of
total loss, or of such damage as to render them unmarketable. .leks v.
Mc('ehee, 419.
17. Where order confirming sale made under foreclosure to mortgagee who
is a party, is at same term vacated and sale set aside for want of notice, in-
surable interest of mortgagor in possession is same as before sale. Ins. Co. v.
Sampson, 220.
18. Where, in such case, loss occurs after confirmation, and before sale set
aside, insurable interest of mortgagor not divested by such unauthorized sale
and confirmation. Id.
19. A policy, providing that it shall be void in case insured shall make other
insurance without consent, is avoided by such subsequent insurance, even though
second policy is itself avoided by similar provision. Turner v. Ins. Co., 275.
20. Policy on articles of furniture described them as "all contained in house
No.- McMillen street, Providence, R. I." Insured, without knowledge of in-
surer, removed these articles to house in another street, where they were con-
sumed. Held, that statement of locality was continuing warranty, and that
insured could not recover. Lyons v. Ins. Co., 419.
21. Contract for insurance with person who has no insurable interest in
property, or who can not sustain any pecuniary loss by injury thereto, is a mere
wager. Spare v. Ins. Co., 409.
22. Judgment creditor has insurable interest in property of debtor; but to
recover, must show that judgment debtor has not sufficient property left, out of
which to satisfy judgment. " Id.
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23. Insurer may be estopped to insist on conditions and restriflons contained
in policy, issued with knowledge of facts inconsistent therewith, but neither
party to contract of insurance void as against public policy is estopped to deny its
legality. Spare v. Ins. Co., 409.
24. After date of contract for sale of house insured against fire, and before
completion of purchase, house was damaged by fire and loss paid by company
in ignorance of contract. The purchase being subsequently completed, and the
purchase-money received by defendants having the effect of c:.tinguishing the
loss, Held, that insurance company could recover amount paid by them.
Castellain v. -Preston, 769, and note: reversing same case, 168, and note.
25. If insured calls upon insurer to pay loss, and latter makes no specific
objection to form or sufficiency of proofs of loss, or to entire neglect to furnish
same in season for claimant to repair error, but declines payment on other
grounds, he cannot set up defects in proof as defence, or most that he can claim
is that question of waiver may go to jury. Mosely v. Ins. Co., 688.
26. Where subject of insurance was only "1 goods and groceries," and there
was clause in policy forbidding the keeping of gunpowder for sale or on storage,
'upon or in the premises insured,'' Held, that meaning of ' ' premises'" here was
"lands and tenements," that it did not include "goods and groceries," and
therefore, if gunpowder had been kept on "premises" not insured, it would
not vitiate policy. Id.
27. A presumption of a man's insanity is not raised by his suicide; but that
fact, in connection with other evidence, is pertinent to issue of insanity,
especially where suicide is immediately preceded by murder or attempted murder
of members of family, and the destruction of his property without any ap-
parent motive or provocation. .Karow v. Ins. Cb., 283.
28. Where there is nothing in policy to contrary, insurer is not released from
liability because property was burned by assured while insane, nor unless
burning was caused by voluntary act, assent, procurement, or design of as-
sured. Id.
29. Collision of steamboats caused fire, and one of them with goods insured
"against immediate loss by fire," sank before goods were burned. Held, that
if damage could have been avoided except for fire, loss was within policy.
Ftp. Co. v. Ins. Co., 75.
30. Person taking out policy in mutual company is at once bound by charter
and by-laws. Ins. Co. v. Miller Lodge, 76.
31. Usage of such company to notify members of annual interest on deposit
notes, and time of payment, does not impose duty so to do. Id.
32. Company cannot, without assent or request of insured, apply to such
annual interest a dividend of profits not expressly made applicable thereto.
Id.
INTEREST. See AcCORD, 3. DnAGEs, 4, 5. EQUITY, 17. IIUSBAND AND
WIPE, 18. LEGACY, 4, 5. NATIONAL BANK, 2.
1. Maker of note being sued, agreed by separate instrument, in consideration
of dismissal of suit, that interest to accrue upon the note should bear interest.
H eld, valid. Jasper Co. v. Taris, 347.
2. Open account bears interest only after-demand. Richardson v. Laclede
Co., 347.
3. Where plaintiff seeks to recover interest on interest, burden of proof is on
him to prove promise to pay same for valuable consideration, and an accept-
ance, actual or constructive, of such promise ; where forbearance is relied on
as such consideration, it must appear that time was actually given in pursuance
of the request implied by the promise. Edgerton v. Weaver, 284.
4. Note was given for debt, with interest added at twenty per cent. ; Texas
statute provides, that 11 all judgments * ** shall bear interest at rate of
eight per cent. per annum, * * * except when the contract upon which the
judgment is founded bears a specified interest greater than eight per cent. per
annum, and not exceeding the highest rate of conventional interest permitted
by law (twelve per cent.), in which case the judgment shall bear the same rate
of interest specified in such contract." Reld, That judgment on above note
only bore interest at eight per cent. Ewell v. Daggs, 689.
INDEX.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CMINA.L LAw, 29. STATUTE, 6.
1. License to sell, from United States, does not dispense with necessity for
license under state law. Pierson v. The State, 419.
2. Sale of liquor by club to members not within statute prohibiting sales
without license. Graff v. Evans, 99, and note.
3. Two persons, unconnected in business, selling liquor to husband habitu-
ally intoxicated, are jointly liable to wife. Rantz v. Barnes, 483.
4. Barkeeper selling liquor to adult and seeing minor present, and under-
standing he is to participate in drinking same, is not guilty of selling or giving
liquor to minor. Siegel v. The People, 623.
5. If jury should find that barkeeper knew that adult was being used by
minor as a screen, they might find him guilty. Id.
6. Indictment fbllowing words of statute, charged defendant with keeping or
maintaining house I Iused for illegal sale or keeping of intoxeating liquor."
Held, That charge must be construed to mean keeping for such illegal use or
with knowledge that house was so used. State v. McGough, 546.
7. At trial upon this indictment, justice allowed defendant's witness to be
asked, in cross-examination, if witness did not tell A., witness for state, that
if A. would mix up testimony in F.'s case, F. would give A. $20. Held,
error, inquiry being irrelevant, as no connection appeared between F.'s case
and case on trial. Id.
8. Justice instructed jury, 11 He, the defendant, is presumed to know the
kind of business which was openly being carried on in his establishment by his
servants and agents. The defendant admitted that he was the keeper of the
place, and that he was there personally in charge of it during the time covered
by the indictment. He is not only presumed to know but he is responsible."
Held, error, knowledge and responsibility of defendant being for jury. Id.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY. See CORPOx.ATION, 14, 15.
JUDGMENT. See ACCORD, 2. CORPORATION, 11. FORMER REcovErn, 1
IxSOLVBCY, 3. INTEREST, 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2. UNITED
STATES COURTS, 5.
1. Court cannot, at subsequent term, correct judgment in respect to costs,
where that subject was considered and judgment entered by clerk as directed
by court, unless such power was carried forward by motion made during term
at which judgment was rendered. Williams v. Williams, 146.
2. Defendant served with process issuing from court of competent jurisdic-
tion is concluded by judgment. Harbig v. -eund, 146.
3. Tim REMEDIES FOR THE COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST DvinT-
ons wno An RESIDENTS OR PROPERTY HOLDERS IN ANOTHER STATE, OR
WITHIN, THE BRITISH DOMINIONS, 697.
JUDICIAL SALE.
1. Caveat emptor applies to administrator's sale of lands for payment of
debts. Tilley v. Bridges, 419.
2. Administrator or executor selling lands under decree of court, has no
authority to warrant title. If purchaser obtains no title, he must, as general
rule, suffer the loss, unless fraud or mistake has entered into transaction. Id.
JURISDICTION. See REMovAL OF CAusEs, 4.
JUROR AND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 13.
1. In the selection of grand and petit jury for Baltimore county, under pro-
visions of Act of 1870, ch. 220, one of forty-eight names drawn for general
panel was non-resident. This name was not among grand jurors. feld,
1. That this did not affect the grand jury. 2. That statute was to be re-
garded mainly as directory, and irregularities not materially violating it or
prejudicing rights of the citizen were not fatal. State v. Glasgow, 347.
2. The IMaryland law which exempts persons over seventy from jury service
does not disable them. Green v. State, 347.
3 Is THE JURY SYSTEM A FAILURE ? 81.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See ACTION, 1. AGENT, I. xFIxTuRE, 6, 8,
12. NEGLIGENCE, 6. WASTE.
INDEX."
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. If lessor deprives lessee of beneficial enjoyment and lessee therefore
abandons premises, it is an eviction. "Skalir v. Shurte, 76.
2. Assignee for creditors, who, in conduct of his trust, continues in posses-
sion of premises let to his assignor, does not become personally liable for rent
unless there be special agreement. White v. Thomas, 76.
3. Demise of factory with fixtures and machinery, implies no warranty that
machinery is in good repair or of sufficient capacity to do work for which
premises were let. Naurnberg v. Young, 146.
4. Owner leased to tenant rooms in upper story approached by stairway com-
mon to all the tenants, the railing of which was out of repair. The stairway
became dangerous from ice and snow and tenant slipped and caught rail, which
gave way. Held, that landlord, who had made no covenant to repair, was not
liable. Percell v. English, 312, and note.
5. A promise to repair made after the lease, is nudum pactum. Id.
6. Landlord who lets tenements in building to different tenants, with right
of way in common over flight of stone steps, without railing, leading from
street to yard, is not liable to tenant injured by falling upon ice accumulated
upon steps, if it is not landlord's duty to keep them clear of ice, although so
constructed. and of such material as to occasion accumulation of ice, there being
no change in construction since tenancy began. Wood v. Cotton Co., 813.
LEGACY.
1. To make legacy specific, it must clearly appear that testator intended
legatee to take particular tiing and nothing else. Wyckoff v. Executors of
Perrine, 754.
2. If debt is subject of specific legacy, payment of debt, whether voluntary
or compulsory, will destroy legacy. .d.
3. Gift of personal property for life, with power to legatee to use it as she
may deem proper, or to sell it, or any part of it, for her benefit, as she may
deem needful or best, Held, absolute. Kendall v. Kendall, 284.
4. Will, executed in 1848, contained clause: "I give and bequeath to my
daughter, -, $1000, to be paid on her marriage or when she arrives at age,
with interest after, at her option." Legatee attained majority in 1849, and was
married in 1853; testatator died in 1854. Held, that legacy drew interest as
soon as daughter arrived at age. Trustees v. Grover, 813.
5. Legacy bears simple interest, and payments should be applied first to
extinguish interest and then principal. Id.
LIBEL.
1. Action for can be maintained against corporation. Evening Journal v.
McDermott, 147.
2. Previous or subsequent publications admissible to show temper of de-
fendant's mind in publication complained of, even though barred by Statute of
Limitations. Id.
3. Publication in newspaper of false statement that person was convicted and
sentenced to prison for libel, is actionable, without proof of special damage.
Boogher v. Knapp, 483.
4. In action for, where language is ambiguous or ironical, plaintiff's ac-
quaintances may state their understanding as to whom charge refers, and what
it imputes, Knapp v. Fuller, 689.
5. Defendant, after suit brought, published another article referring to plain-
tiff by name : admissible to show animus. Id.
6. What one of defendants said, few days after first publication, manifesting
hostile feeling toward plaintiff, also admissible. Id.
7. Defendant wrote defamatory statements of plaintiff in letter to W.,
under circumstances making it privileged, but by mistake placed it in envelope
directed to another person, who received and read letter. Held, that publica-
tion was privileged in absence of malice in fact. Tompson v. Dashwood, 754.
8. If any one, including proprietor of newspaper, goes out of his way to
asperse personal character of public man, and to ascribe to him base and cor-
rupt motives, he does so at his peril, and must either prove truth'of what he
says or answer in damages. Negley v. Farrow, 813.
INDEX.
LIBEL.
9. Malice, but not in ordinary sense of hatred or ill will, is essential ele-
ment in action for libel; but if publication be in itself libellous, law in such
case implies malice, and only question before jury on plea of not guilty, pub-
lication being established, 'is the amount of damage; in estimating which, jury
are to consider whether article was published wantonly, or as editors of news-
paper honestly commenting upon official conduct of plaintiff. Negley v. Far-
row, 813.
10. Statute 32, Geo. III, ch. 60, not in force in Maryland, where court
always decides whether publication is in law a libel. Id.
LICENSE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 5, 16. INTOXICATING LIQUOR, I.
LIEN. See ADMIRALTy, 3. ATTACHIMENT, 4. CORPoRATION, 9. HUSBAND
AND WIFE, 7. 16. INSURANCE, 14. ,
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See BILL op REvIEw. GIFT, 2. TRUST
AND TRUSTEE, 9.
1. May be pleaded by a county. Gains v. Hot Springs County, 419.
2. In action for damage against railroad company for unreasonable delay
in transportation of merchandise, where portion of delay occurred more than
six years prior to date of writ, the damage for that portion of delay was
barred. Jones v. Railway Co., 420.
3. Action entirely arising out of a statute not within. Cowenhoven v. .Ree-
holders, 147.
4. Is not suspended or waived by representation made by administrator to
Orphans' Court to procure order to sell lands for payment of debts, nor is
order of sale such an adjudication as prevents administrator setting it up at
law. Everett v. Williams, 548.
5. New cause of action, cannot escape statute, by being introduced by way
of amendment into declaration in action for different cause, brought before
lapse of statutory time. North Chicago Co. v. Asonka, 814.
6. But where new count is added merely to restate same cause of action,
plea of statute thereto is improper. d.
7. Upon a plea of, the only evidence given of possession during first year
was that defendant's grantor went once upon the land, set up two stakes at
what he was told were corners, tried to ascertain the boundaries and afterwards
paid the taxes for the year. Held, insufficient. Bradstreet v. Kinsella, 348.
8. Instrument signed by maker and witnessed, stating that maker had
received of S. a horse, for wbich he promised to pay S., or order, a sum named
in one month from date, "said horse to be and remain the entire and absolute
property of the said S. until paid for in full by me," is not a promissory note,
and an action brought thereon, more than six years after its date, cannot be
maintained. Sloan v. McCarty, 689.
9. Action to foreclose mortgage, given to secure note, may be commenced at
any time within twenty-one years after execution, notwithstanding note is
barred by statute. Riddle v. Howenstein, 689.
10. Award under seal is specialty within meaning of statute, though submis-
sion was by parol. Halnon v. Halnon, 689.
11. "I thank you for your very kind intentions to give up the rent of Tyn-
y-bwrwydd next Christmas, but I am happy to say at that time both principal
and interest will have been paid in full." Held, sufficient acknowledgment to
bar statute. Green v. Humphreys, 754.
12. Trusts which fall within exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity are not
subject to statute. Buckingham v. Ludlum, 754.
13. Courts of equity only follow statute by analogy, and when it is not
against conscience to do so. Id.
14. Creditor of firm may have relief in equity for payment of his debt,
against separate assets left by deceased partner, if surviving partner be insol-
vent and firm assets exhausted. Id.
15. Representatives of deceased partner cannot set up statute against firm
creditor, so long as surviving partner continues liable for debt and has right to
seek contribution from deceased partner's estate, for payment of debts offirm. Id.
16. One partner cannot set up statute against other, where there have been
dealings in respect to partnership affairs, within six years. Id.
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LUNATIC. See INsANITY.
1. Incapable of acquiring pauper settlement in his own right. Inhabitants,
4-c., v. Inhabitants, 4-c., 147.
2. Such a person, until forty-eight years of age, lived in his father's family
and was then sent to insane hospital. Held, That he followed father's residence
acquired while pauper was in hospital. Id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. See ABATEBJNT. COnrORAION, 1.
1. Voluntary dismissal of civil action is prima fstie evidence of want of
probable cause. Wetmore v. Mellinger, 711.
2. Although action is commenced with probable cause, yet if plaintiff con-
tinues to prosecute it when there is no probable cause, he is liable for malicious
prosecution. That probable cause had ceased to exist, must, however, appear
otherwise than from evidence introduced on trial. Id., and note.
3. Advice of counsel, on full and fair statement of facts and information,
will not protect, unless acted on in good faith. Id.
4. On issue of probable cause, certain depositions in former suit, tending to
show that defendant could have ascertained facts which would have had impor-
tant hearing on such issue, adversely to his right to maintain prior action, were
admissible. .d.
5. N. C. Co., a corporation, with malice and without probable cause, sued
M. and others, in civil action, and by order of injunction made on its ex parte
application, prevented M., and others from entering upon their property, and
also from prosecuting profitable business. After year had passed, N. C. Co.
dismissed its action. Held, that company was liable in action of malicious pros-
ecution, and that measure of damages was value of use of property, in business,
during period of ouster. Coal Co. v. Upson, 483.
MANDAMUS.
Will not lie upon relation of citizen and owner of land abutting upon street
through which line of railroad authorized by ordinancd would pass, to compel
city clerk to make advertisement required by ordinance. State v. Henderson,
221.
MARRIAGE. See CONTRACT, 6. HuSBAND AND WI'E.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See AGENT, 8, 9. NEGLIGENCE, 5.
1. Railroad company and its train hands must guard ie trackmen from
danger as far as practicable. Dick v. Railroad, 76.
2. Agreement between connecting lines of railroad does not affect third par-
ties, nor make employees of one line co-employees of others. Railroad Co. v.
State, 77.
3. Contract to work for period of seven months for $14 per month is entire,
and full performance, or valid excuse for non-performance, must be shown to
recover thereon. Kopltz v. Powell, 284.
4. Servant not ordinarily required to work during unseasonable hours ; bat
if he voluntarily does so, it is no ground for claiming extra compensation or that
there is breach of contract by employer. Id.
5. Mere request to perform unseasonable service does not justify servant in
quitting; nor does refusal to perform same justify discharge. Id.
6. Person employed by city to superintend digging of trench, and one em-
ployed as laborer to dig trench, by same master, are primafacie fellow servants.
Flynn v. City, 814.
7. Master not liable for injury occurring from negligence of fellow-workman,
unless latter was known to be careless or incompetent. Fones v. Phillips,
420.
8. Where performance of duties peculiar to master is intrusted to mere work-
man, such workman, quoad hoc, and to extent of master's duty intrusted to him,
stands in master's place, and his negligence binds master. Id.
9. It is duty of master, in assigning servant to duty at or about dangerous
machinery, to give detailed and special warning as to all latent dangers, not dis-
coverable by reasonable and ordinary exercise of diligence. Id.
10. Corporation is negligent if it employs an imprudent or incompetent per-
son as master over other employees, and responsible for injury to another
856 INDEX.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
servant, without fault, from negligence of such master; especially where
injured employee was child receiving orders solely from said master and with-
out access to president or general superintendent: and it makes no difference
that master violated orders. Atlanta Cotton Factory v. Speer, 147.
11. Railroad company is liable in action on behalf of fireman killed by
washing out of culvert, which was in improper condition, resulting from
negligence and carelessness of its bridge-builder and road-master: his neg-
ligence was negligence of defendant, and notice to him of defective construction
was notice to latter. Davis v. Railroad Co., 623.
12. Workman was injured by break of elevator chain and fall of elevator.
His business was to load elevator on lower floor and unload it on upper.
Staircase near elevator connected the floors, and workman was injured while
riding with his load on elevator. It appearing that chain had broken some six
weeks before and had been repaired, and evidence being conflicting whether
employer's superintendent had been notified of break, and it also appearing
that ratchets to arrest fall of elevator were not in working order: Held, that
employer's negligence was for the jury, and that he was not relieved from
liability if defective condition of chain and ratchets arose from negligence of
fellow-workmen of plaintiff, whose duty it was to take care of them. Afulvey
v. Loco otive Works, 623.
13. AI., while using machine in his capacity of workman for manufacturing
company discovered its defects and unsafe condition and complained to foreman,
under whose orders he worked and whose duty it was to see that machinery was
in order. Foreman promised to remedy defects and directed him to work on
machine. AL thereupon continued to use maciine, and, in so doing, was in-
jured through said defects before any steps were taken to remedy same. Held,
that his knowledge was not conclusive of contributory negligence, but was a
fact to be considered by jury in determining that question. Manufacturing Co.
v. Morrissey, 574, "and note.
MECOHAICS' LIEN.
Where promissory note is given and received in payment for materials and
work the lien is waived. Crooks v. Door, Sash and Lumber Co., 348.
MINOR. See IiqANT. GUARDIAw AND WARD. PARENT AND CmM.
MORTGAGE. See ATTACH1MENT, 2. COVENANT, 2. DEED, 4. Dnimss, 3.
FIxTuRp, 4, 5, 7. HUSeND AND WIpr, 15, 19. IisuizAcE, 17, 18. Lim-
ITATIONS, STATUTE Or, 9. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 3, 4. UNITED STATES
COURTS, 4. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 2, 3.
I. Of chattels.
1. Owner of land, or mortgagor in possession after condition broken, may
make valid chattel mortgage of growing crop superior to lien of subsequent
attachment. imball v. Sattley, 689.
2. Mortgage of chattels belonging to another with oral consent or ratification
of owner, cannot affect subsequent mortgage of same chattels by owner to one
without notice of ratification. Mlaier v. Davis, 549.
I. Of realty.
3. Right of mortgagee to recover on insurance policy or mortgage where debt
has been paid on the other. Castellain v. Preston, 168, note.
4. Trustee in deed of trust is trustee for both debtor and creditor, and he
must use efforts of prudent man to protect all interests in property. Ventres
v. Cobb, 284.
5. All persons must take notice of boundaries of counties and legislative
changes thereof. Welch v. Stearns, 147.
6. Where mortgage has been recorded in one county and mortgaged pre-
mises become by legislative enactment part of another county, notice of fore-
closure should be published in county in which the land is when notice is given.
Id.
7. Generally, one purchasing land subject to mortgage, by express agreement
assumes the mortgage. In such case, as between parties, purchaser becomes
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MORTGAGE.
primarily liable and mortgaged property the primary fund for payment of debt.
George v. 4ndrews, 755.
8. Mortgagee may, by his dealings with purchaser and mortgagor, recognise
purchaser as principal and mortgagor as only security. Id.'
9. Extension of time of payment of mortgage by agreement between holder
and purchaser, without concurrence of mortgagor, discharges him from liability.
ld.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 20. CONTRACT,
21. LIMITATIoNs, STATUTE OF, 1. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, 1. OnL-
WANO.. SURETY, 4. TAXATION, 1. WuHAF, 2.
1. City not liable for negligent acts of officers or men employed in fire depart-
ment. Wilcox v. City, 814.
2. Board of supervisors'can, in good faith, compromise judgment in favor of
county. Collins v. Welch, 148.
3. When tax collector arrests tax-payer for non-payment of tax already paid
and which is thereupon paid a second time, the town is not liable for arrest, nor
for money while in hands of collector. Inhabitants, 4-c., v. Hurd, 148.
4. Power of to pass ordinance interfering with rights of individuals or public
must clearly appear in its charter ; authority to pass ordinances to suppress
gambling, and such others for peace and good of town, as may be deemed ex-
pedient, not repugnant to constitution, &c., does not warrant passage of ordi-
nance forbidding keeping of billiard table for hire. State v. Belvidere, 148.
5. Bound by unauthorized acts of officers of that branch which is invested with
jurisdiction to act for corporation upon subject to which particular act relates.
City v. Railroad Co., 284.
6. Property of county being held for public, is under uncontrolled power of
General Assembly. Harris v. Board of" Supervisors, 483.
7. Where bonds donated by municipal corporation to railroad company re-
cited, on their face, that an election had been held in accordance with author-
izing statutes, Held, 1. That defect in method of election in no way impairs vali-
dity of bonds in hands of bona fide holder. 2. That decision of state Supreme
Court to contrary, is not binding on United States Supreme Court. Town of
Pana v. Bowler, 484.
8. In the absence of express power city cannot subscribe or donate to manu-
facturing company, and bonds so given are not valid in hands of purchaser for
value but with knowledge. Ottawa v. Carey, 549.
9. In Illinois, under constitution of state, corporate authorities of cities can-
not be invested with power to levy and collect taxes except for corporate pur-
poses; hence city could not borrow money nor issue bonds unless it had power
to pay same by taxation. 1d.
10. City has power to establish such reasonable appliances in public thor-
oughfares where railroads pass, as will by temporary arrest of travel, protect
public from danger. Textor v. Railroad Co., 348.
11. In action against, for damages resulting from breaking of plank in
bridge, the ground is positive misfeasance, or else neglect ; in latter case notice
of condition of street is necessary, in the former not. Mfayor, 4w., of Bruns-
wick v. Braxton, 348.
12. Legislature having provided for assessment of tax on railroad companies,
and its payment and collection by comptroller-general, if power to assess and
levy tax on railroads had been conferred on municipal corporation by previous
act, it must yield to last act on subject. City v. Savannah Railway Co., 755.
13. City had notice of hole in sidewalk near railroad crossing and neglected'
to repair same within reasonable time. Person in passing over such walk, ex-
ercising due care, stepped into hole, whereby be was unavoidably thrown upon
railway track before approaching train, and in attempting to get up his clothes
caught upon rail or spike in sidewalk, and he was killed by train. Hield, that
city was liable. City v. Schmidt, 81U.
14. Under Illinois constitution corporate authorities of cities cannot be in-
vested with power to levy and collect taxes except for corporate purposes. Held,
that unless city had been invested with power to raise money by public taxation
to be devoted to private parties for developing water-power in city or vicinity
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for manufacturing purposes, bonds so given were void in hands of purchaser
with notice. City v. Carey, 755.
15. Semble, that power to subscribe to company's stock would not, of itself,
authorize donation to it. 1d.
16. Under general grant of power to declare what shall be a nuisance town
authorities will have no right to pass ordinance declaring thing a nuisance which
is clearly not such ; in doubtful cases the action of the authorities will bind the
court. Railway Co. v. Town of Lake 'ew, 420.
17. On the other hand there are many things which courts, without proof,
will declare nuisances, and ordinance declaring them such will be valid on its
face ; of this character is use of steam for propelling street cars along thickly
populated public street. id.
18. Where city is, by its charter, limited to levy of one per cent. of taxes for
all purposes whatever, three-tenths of which shall be for payment of its bonded
indebtedness, and city does levy one per cent. tax, court, on application of cred-
itor who has recovered judgment on bonds of city, will compel application of
three-tenths of such taxes to payment of such judgment, if that much is neces-
sary. City v. Underwood, 421.
19. Where county courts were authorized to subscribe in behalf of township
to stock of railroad company "1 building or proposing to build a railroad into,
through or near such township," and to issue county bonds in payment, and
there was a vote of township in favor of issuing certain bonds and subscription
was made and bonds issued, reciting that they were authorized by vote of peo-
ple and issued under order of court ; it appearing that, at time vote was taken
and bonds issued, company only proposed to build road from point nine miles
distant from township to further distance, and interest on the bonds having been
paid for three years, Held, that courts should acquiesce in determination by
qualified voters and local authorities that proposed road was "1 near" township.
Kirkbride v. Lafayette County, 690.
20. Under constitution of Missouri, city ordinance is void which undertakes
to confer upon one person right to remove and convert to his own use carcases
of all dead animals, not slain for food, found within limits of city, to exclusion
of right of owners to remove and use them before they become a nuisance.
River Rendering Co. v. Behr, 690.
MURDER. See CnImIN.L LA-w, V.
NATIONAL BANKS. See BANr, 4, 5. CRI3sINAL LAir, 20, 27. ERRORS AND
APPEALs, 11.
I. Have power to lend money upon personal obligation secured by pledge of
warehouse receipt. Cleveland v. Bank, 690.
2. Interest received by, greater than lawful rate can not be set off in action
on note; but bank can only ree6ver face of note without interest. Bank v.
r Childs, 348.
3. Where stockholder, with good ground to apprehend failure of bank, col-
lusively transfers his shares to irresponsible person, transaction will be deemed
a fraud on creditors and transferror will be held to liability imposed by 12 of
- et of June 3d 1864. Bowden v. Johnson, 285.
4. Bill in equity in such a case, praying for discovery as well s relief,
sustained. Id.
5. National banking act confers power to receive special deposits, and where
national bank has been accustomed to receive United States bonds as such,
gratuitously, it is liable for loss occurring through want of that degree of care
which good business man would exercise in keeping property of such value.
Bank v. Zent, 484.
6. Demand, and refusal by bank to deliver, with no other explanation than
statement that it has no such bonds in its possession, furnish sufficient proof
of loss by negligence. rd.
7. Sect. 3466 Rev. Stat. U. S., giving priority to demands of United States
against insolvents cannot be applied to demands against national banks which
have failed, because inconsistent with national banking act. Bank v. United
States, 484.
INDEX.
NEGLIGENCE. See B.ILUENT. C03L.ON CARRIER, 10, 1. MALSTNR AND
SERVANT, 11, 13. MUNICIPAL CORPORTION, 1, 11. 13. NATIONAL BANKS,
5, 6. RAILROAD, 4, 6, 8. SHIPPING, 2.
1. Is the omission to use ie means reasonably necessary to avoid injury to
others. Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 117, and note.
2. To maintain action for, there must be fault on part of defendant and no
want of ordinary care on part of plaintiff. Difference between ordinary and
slight negligence. Comparative negligence. Id.
3. Aside from statutory or municipal regulation,,no rate of speed at which
railroad train may be run is negligence per se. Powell v. Railway, 485.
4. In clear case of contributory negligence the court should direct jury to
find for defendant Id.
5. If negligence of railroad company contributes to injury, company is
liable, even though negligence of fellow-servant also contributes. Railway Co.
v. Cummings, 285.
6. When bowl is set by landlord in tenant's room for his exclusive use, with
apertures insufficient to carry off all water delivered by faucet if left open,
and this defect and tenant's negligence in using bowl are together the cause of
damage, liability of landlord is that of owner as distinguished from that of
occupant. McCarthy v. Savings Bank, 285.
7. Landlord does not insere against tenant's negligence, nor does his liabil-
ity follow from fact that building does not contain most improved system of
water pipes. 
Id.
8. That boy between six and seven was upon railroad track at or near street
crossing, though his father had shortly before seen him going toward track,
not enough to establish contributory negligence as matter of law. Johnson v.
Railroad, 148.
9. One who places in hands of child article known to be dangerous, is liable
for natural and probable result of his act, although there be an intervening
agency. Binford v. Johnson, 50, and 
note.
10. Act in direct violation of criminal statute negligence per se. Id.
11. Liability for injury received by child while trespassing. Id, note.
12. Railroad company liable, notwithstanding negligence of intestate, if or-
dinary care was not exercised by its employees after they knew of intestate's
negligence. Beerns v. Railroad Co., 148.
13. Natural effects of tort are those which might reasonably be foreseen
proximate effects those between which and the tort there intervenes no culpable
and efficient agency. Mere failure by third parties to extinguish fire started
through negligence of defendant, not such agency. Wiley v. Railrdad Co.,
148.
14. Where passenger is injured by mutual negligence of servants of com-
pany on whose train he is rightfully travelling, and of servants of another com-
pany with whom lie has no contract, action may be maintained against either
company. Railway Co. v. Shacklet, 421.
15. No legal presumption that railroad company, while in exercise of lawful
right to run its locomotives and trains over its road and to use fire in so doing,
will not permit fire to escape. Palmer v- Railway, 485.
16. That railroad company uses good machinery and most approved ap-
pliances to prevent escape of fire, and has careful and competent men in charge,
will not, in case fire does escape of itself, rebut prima face inference of
negligence. Id.
17. Railroad companies must use reasonable precautions to prevent fire being
carried against all except extraordinary and unusual winds. Id.
18. Where obstruction in street is in plain view of driver of vehicle, and he
drives against it, he is guilty of contributory negligence, and it is no answer to
say that his attention was taken up with looking above ground to direct team.
Yaha v. City, 644.
19. That woman sixty-seven years old, injured by being knocked down by
horse and wagon, while crossing street on some flagstones at junction with two
other streets, all much travelled, in compact part of city, did not, before and
while crossing, look up or down the street but straight ahead, is not conclusive
evidence of want of due care; question is for jury. Shapleigh v. Wyman, 690.
INDEX.
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20. Person sailing in his yacht on Lord's day in violation of statute, if ran
into by steamboat, can only maintain action if act of those in charge of steam-
boat was wanton and malicious. Wallace v. River Jrav. and Ex. Co., 691.
21. Freight car was left standing on side track so near main track as to make
collision inevitable. Passenger was sitting with elbow on sill of open window
resting his head on his hand. Corner of coach struck freight car so that it
jarred the passenger's elbow outside window and his arm was crushed between
the two cars. field, that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. Far-
low v. Kelly, 421.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.
1. Overdue coupon of municipal bond which has not matured, is. Town of
Thompson v. Perrine, 221.
2. Transfer after maturity, of interest coupons payable to bearer on day
named, only passes title of transferror. McKim v. King, 77.
NOTARY PUBLIC. See BILIS AND NOTES, 27. CxnI.IsNAL LAW, 27.
NOTICE. See ATTACHMENT, 8. BANK, 2. MORTGAGE, 5. MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATION, 11. RAILROAD, 12. SURETY, 1.
Purchaser is not chargeable with constructive notice of all instruments
and incumbrances of record, but only of such as lie in apparent chain of title.
Grandies v. Reid, 815.
NOVATION. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 7
NUISANCE. See EQUITY, 15. INJUN CTIO, 4. MuxzCiPA COR'ORATION,
16, 17.
1. Ringing at early hour (to arouse boarding-house keepers or operatives
living with them) of bell weighing 2000 pounds and set in open tower 40 feet
from ground, and so situated as to residences owned and occupied before erec-
tion of bell, that they receive full force of sound, the inmates being deprived
of sleep and their comfort impaired, is a private nuisance; and mill owner may
be restrained by injunction, the ringing not being shown to be necessary or
reasonable; and evidence of custom to so ring bells in other places is inadmis-
sible. Davis v. Sawyer, 349.
2. NOISE AND VIBRATION AS ELEMtENTS OF TuISAxCE, 625.
OFFICER. See ATTACHMENT, 2, 3, 6, 7. ATTORNEY, 1. PROHIBITION, 2.
SHiERIFF, 2.
1. Town marshal may be bailiff. Constable cannot be sheriff, deputy sheriff
or clerk of superior court, but may be marshal. Lewis v. Wall, 549.
2. Where officer is called upon by nature of service, to make an inquiry and
investigation after process comes into his hands, he is only required to exercise
reasonable care, skill and diligence in so doing. Street v. Pennell, 285.
3. A sheriff who erroneously certifies in levy on land that appraisers were
disinterested, is not liable in absence of negligence. Id.
4. Remedy for such error is in motion for leave to amend return, and in
power of court under such motion, to extenl necessary relief. id.
5. In absence of constitutional or legislative restriction, where no definite
term of office is prescribed by law, power of removal is incident to power of
appointment, and that power is sole judge of existence of cause. Patton v.
Vraaghan, 422.
6. In action on treasurer's official bond, his settlement with count&ourt is
conclusive. Hunnicutt v. Kirkpatrick, 422.
ORDINANCE.
1. Charter and ordinances of city stand in same relation as constitution and
statutes of state. Quinette v. City, 485.
2. Where city charter provided tiat judges of election should receive no pay,
and repealed all inconsistent ordinances, field, that ordinance providing for
pay of judges and clerks was repealed only as to judges. Id.
PARENT AND CHILD.
1. Father of infant child is entitled to its custody rather than mother ; and
INDEX.
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when father has entrusted child to grandmother, her custody is in legal intend-
ment his. State v. Barney, 422.
2. Hence, when mother, assisted by her brother, forcibly took the child so
entrusted from its grandmother, the force being exerted by the brother at
mother's request, Held, that brother was criminally liable for assault and
battery. Id.
PARDON.
Unconditional pardon cannot be treated as nullity on habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, after re-arrest on ground that pardon was fraudently obtained by acts
done to affect prisoner's health and reuresentations concerning it. Knapp v.
Thomas, 485.
PARTITION.
1. At common law, partition operates by way of delivery of possession and
estoppel ; in equity, unless otherwise provided by statute, the transfer of title
in partition can only be effected by execution of conveyance, which may be de-
creed, and compelled by attachment. Gay v. Parpart, 221.
2. Where decree for partition erroneously declared nature of estate of each
co-tenant and deeds were made three days after which did not follow decree,
ol being brought twelve years afterwards to perfpct partition by compelling
conveyances in accordance with original decree, Held, that court could in-
quire into equities of parties arising out of surrounding circumstances and
refuse to decree conveyance when inequitable to do so. Id.
3. If original decree was made by consent of party against whom error was
committed, without valuable consideration, and no one is interested but volun-
teers or purchasers with full notice, no such decree will be made. Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See CORPORATION, 10. EXECUTORs AND AD3INISTRATORS,
3, 5. Fonmac RECOVERY, 1. LImITATIONs, STATUTE OF, 13-16.
1. Action at law lies for breach of contract to form copartnership. Hill V.
Palmer, 149.
2. If damages from breach of partnership agreement belong exclusively to
one partner, and can be assessed without taking an account of partnership busi-
ness, lie may maintain an action at law. Id.
3. One partner can not assign firm property for benefit of creditors, unless
his copartner can not be consulted. Lieb v. Pierpont, 34, and note.
4. Partner purchasing in good faith interest of copartner, though firm be
known to be insolvent, can claim exemption out of what was partnership pro-
perty as against partnership creditors. Afortley v. F7anagen, 77.
5. Executor or administrator of surviving partner dying while settling busi-
ness, is entitled to assets, and must complete settlement, unless relieved by
contract or order of court; and he may be compensated for so doing. Dayton
v. Bartlett, 77.
6. Where parties agree to share in profits, law will infer partnership ; but
presumption may be rebutted. Lockwood v. Doane, 815.
7. Rule ormnia prasumuntur contra spoliatorem is for wrongdoers, and should
not be applied to case where failure to perform duty (as to keep accounts) is due
solely to incapacity. Diamond v. Henderson, 550.
8. In action by one partner against another for accounting, though it appears
on trial that nothing is due plaintiff, yet, if defendant unreasonably neglected
to render account, there should be judgment adjusting rights of parties, and
court may impose costs on defendant. Id.
9. Where one member of firm goes out and new partner takes his place, and
business is conducted under same style, customer of old firm selling and deliver-
ing goods to new firm after change, but without notice of it, can hold either firm
liable, but not both. Scarf v. Jardine, 364, and note.
10. Where partners sought and obtained aid of accountant in adjusting ac-
counts, for purpose of settlement, and he prepared paper showing what he con-
sidered a fair settlement, which they adopted, Held, no arbitration or award,
but that paper merely'constitnted settlement, liable to be opened for mistake.
Stage v. Gorch, 807.
11. Where it is clearly shown that one partner has made advances for use of
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firm of considerable sums, which were not taken into consideration at settlement,
on bill filed by one of partners for account, Held, that case should have been re-
ferred to master to state accounts anew, so far as concerned omitted items. Stage
v. Gorich, 407.
12. Where fire insurance is effected by member of firm in firm's name, upon
property of firm, and premium is paid from funds of firm, though charged by
such member to himself, insurance will be for benefit of firm, notwithstanding
member thus effecting it intends it for his own private benefit. Tebbetts v.
Dearborn, 422.
13. If one partner on dissolution of firm, sells his interest in partnershii
stock to copartner, relying alone upon agreement of latter to pay firm indebted-
ness, retiring partner will have no lien on goods for payment of partnership
liabilities, that can be enforced in equity. Parker v. Merritt, 422.
14. But where on dissolution, goods equal in amount to firm's indebtedness
are left with continuing partner, to be converted into money with'which to pay
partnership indebtedness, he is trustee of such goods for that purpose, and the
trust may be enforced in equity by retiring partner for benefit of partnership
creditors, as against subsequent purchasers or execution creditors, with notice
of equities of retiring partner. Id.
15. Where surviving partner, with acquiescence of personal representatives
of deceased partner, and in good faith, carries on the business and pays debts
incurred in so doing, with partnership assets, such disposition thereof will be
valid, and cannot be treated as a fraud in law upon partnership creditors; but
upon bill filed by personal representatives of deceased partner, or partnership
creditor, he can be compelled to wind up firm business and apply its assets to
payment of its debts. Fitzpatrick v..lanagan, 221.
16. If partner, hound to give his time to business of firm, and not to engage
in any other speculation or business in his own name and on his own account
to detriment of firm, uses his time, and labor and materials of firm, in making
improvements in machines manufactured and sold by firm, with knowledge and
without objection of other partners, they can claim no interest in letters patent
procured by him, at his expense and -in his name, for such improvements.
B8elcher v. Whittemore, 815.
17. Agreement provided that superintendent should receive for his services
one-sixth of net profits on city contract; he should have privilege of drawing
fixed sum per month, and of inspecting the books of account; but it was ex-
pressly agreed that he was not a partner with contractor, and was not to be in
any manner liable for damages growing out of prosecution of contract, other
than as such superintendent. Held, on bill filed by superintendent against con-
tractor and city, that he was not a partner. Reddington v. Lanahan, 486.
18. Three railroads operated under partnership arrangement, three lines of
road. B. obtained judgment against one of the railroads for injuries, not know-
ing of partnership. He levied on engine, &c., owned by the three companies,
and same were sold to his agent L. He had levied upon another such engine and
advertised it for sale, when he was enjoined. Bill having been brought set-
ting up superior rights of partnership creditors, -Held, that court will not
enjoin where equities are equal, or where, as here, it does not clearly appear
that partnership indebtedness existed at time of seizure, or especially under
statute, whereby passenger, injured through negligence, has right in attaching
engine, &e., superior to general equity of partners. Railroad Co. v. Bixby,
691.
PARTY WALL. See CoVENANT, 5.
PATENT. See CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw, 3. CONTRACT, 4. PAnTNEUsHip, 16.
1. For mechanism cannot be re-issued so as to cover process. Wing v.
Anthony, 149.
2. Design of patent laws is to reward a substantial discovery or invention.
Atlantic Works v. Brady, 286.
3. Patent not set up by way of defence, where there is no dispute as to time
it was issued, may be referred to, in connection with other testimony as to in-
vention, to fix date thereof. Id.
INDEX.
PATENT.
4. Bill may be dismissed because inventions described in patent are not pat-
entable, even when no such defence is set np in answer. Slawson v. Railway
Co., 423.
5. Where patentee is not pioneer in field, but has merely devised new
form to accomplish results known in that field, his patent cannot be extended
to embrace substantially different form. Duff v. Pump Co., 756.
6. Device capable of doing work of patented invention but not designed or
used for that purpose, and which would not be taken to be intended to be used
in that way, not a " prior invention." Clough v. Manfg. Co., 77.
PAYMENT. See BILLS AND NoTEs, 19. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 8, 9
1. To recover back money paid to prevent illegal distress for taxes it is suf-
ficient to show that such distress was impending and would certainly have been
made. Howard v. City, 149.
2. Simple acceptance by suit or otherwise, by third person, of promise made
to pay debt due him from another, will not release such other person ; it must
appear that subsequent obligation was accepted in lieu of original debtor's.
Briscoe v. Callahan, 691.
PENSION.
1. Money due for, not liable to seizure by creditors, until it has come to pen-
sioner's hands. State v. Assoc., 149.
2. Exemption under 4747 Rev. Stat., applies only while money is in
course of transmission. Triplett v. Graham, 149.
PILOTAGE.
1. State law of Georgia compelling masters of vessels bearing towards any
port of that state (except coasters plying between ports thereof and of South
Carolina and Florida) to receive first pilot offering outside of bar, under penalty
of payment of full pilotage in case of refusal, does not violate art. 4, see. 2 of
Constitution U. S. Thompson v. Sprague, 222.
2. But the exception in said law is contrary to section 4237 U. S. Rev.
Stat., and annulled by it, except as to ports situated on waters which are the
boundary between Georgia and those states. As to these, master may employ
any pilot licensed or authorized by laws of either state. Id.
3. Prior contract between master and another pilot will not give right to re-
ject pilot first offering. Id.
4. Contract between commissioners of pilotage and licensed pilots to limit
the number of pilots for three years to ten, was void. It is the duty of commis-
sionc'rs to supply the port with sufficient number of pilots, and those licensed
have no right to prevent the issuing of a license to others in discretion of com-
missioners. Wright v. Commissioners, 149.
PLEADING. See DAMAGES, 7. EQUITY, 8, 12. FIxTURE, 2, 3. LI:nITATIONS,
STATUTE O1, 5, 6. PATENT, 4.
1. Count in tort for deceit in sale of stock may be joined with count in con-
tract to recover back price paid. Teague v. Irwin, 815.
2. General rule in torts and parol contracts is that day when tort was com-
mitted or contract made, is not material. When made material by defendant's
plea, plaintiff may reply by another day. Duffy v. Patten, 423.
3. Trover and case may be joined.. McConnell v. Leighton, 423.
4. In action on insurance policy it is not necessary to set out in &ae verba
the several conditions therein, and then allege performance ; or to prove that
insured did not die in duel, or while employed on railroad, &c. Tripp v. Ins.
Co., 191.
PLEDGE. See CoRpnrTIosr, 21, 25.
POLITICAL ASSESSMIENTS. See CninxAL LAw, 28.
POSSESSION. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE Or, 7. TREsPASs, 2.
POUND. See REPLEviN, 6, 7.
POWER OF ATTORNEY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 15.
INDEX.
PRACTICE.
1. On judgment for plaintiff on demurrer, defendant has no right to have
damages assessed by jury. Hanley v. Sutherland, 286.
2. Rule of court provided that execution of writing, the foundation of claim
of set off, need not be proved, unless affidavit is filed denying the same. Held,
that want of such affidavit does not prevent plaintiff from showing that instru-
ment, dated January 2d, was executed January 1st, and that his duplicate
differed from defendant's. Ames v. Quimby, 150.
3. Charge that plaintiff was not bound by mistake in carrying out price in
bill of particulars, it not appearing by record what were contents of the bill,
held, not erroneous. Id.
4. Supreme Court of United States cannot review, on second nrit of error,
its own judgment on first. Id.
PRESUIPTION. See BILLS AND NOTES, 4. Do3ricirL, 3. HuSnAND AND
WIFE, 12. INSURANCE, 27. PARTNERsHIP, 7.
None in law that man who disappeared at unknown date in 1809, was dead
on 29th of April 1816. Dean v. Bittner, 691.
PROCESS. See CORPORATION, 18.
1. Service of summons on non-resident while going to, attending or return-
ing from trial, as witness or party, is not a nullity, but court will set it aside
or change venue, or otherwise remedy any special disadvantage such service
entails upon defendant. MlIassey v. Colville, 550.
2. Citizen of Pennsylvania was extradited to Ohio, upon application of C.
A. & Co., in criminal prosecution. Held, that service of summons and order
of arrest in civil action by said C. A. & Co., directly after he had entered
into recognisance to appear at next term and before conviction, and before
opportunity to return home, was rightfully set aside. Compton v. Wilder, 692.
PROHIBITION.
1. Writ of prohibition lies only to inferior judicial tribunal, and not to
bodies exercising ministerial and administrative powers only. Dougan v.
District Court, 528, and -note.
2. Where statute authorizes administrative or ministerial body (as council
of city), to appoint an officer to hold during its pleasure, such body can remove
in its discretion, and exercise of such discretion cannot be controlled or re-
strained by the courts. Id.
3. To justify disregard of order of court it should appear upon face of plead-
ing that court had no jurisdiction. rd.
4. Where court is proceeding to punish disregard of illegal order, as for
contempt, it is proper case for preventive relief by prohibition. Id.
PUBLIC POLICY. See CONTIIACT, 5, 6, 10. Costron.,TioN, 23. PILOTAGE, 4.
RAILROAD. See CORPOxRATION, 17. EVIDENCE, 1. INFANT, 6, 7. MASTER
AND SERVANT, 1, 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 12. NEGLIGENCE, 3, 12,
15, 17.
1. When company has right of constructing partiejular line, with general
power to purchase property, it may purchase road constructed on that line.
Branch v. Jesup, 222.
2. Are quasi public corporations, and can be controlled by courts to extent
of interest of public therein. McCoy v. Railroad Co., 725, and note.
3. Railroad company cannot bind itself to deliver to particular stock-yard
all live stock coming over its line to certain point, and may be compelled to
treat all equally by injunction at suit of proprietor of stock-yards discriminated
against. Id.
4. A passenger injured in a sleeping-car may, in absence of notice, assume
the whole train to be under one management, and sue the railroad company.
Railroad v. Wolrath, 78.
5. Is liable for proper transportation of passenger to point of destination on
through ticket, as for baggage on through check; and this, notwithstanding
notice on ticket that company shall not be liable except as to its own line.
Railroad Co. v. Coombs, 756.
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6. Owner of ox which was upon railroad track through his negligence, and
by collision with which cars and engine are thrown off track and damaged, is
liable therefor. Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 756.
7. If animal escaped from enclosure without owner's knowledge or fault, he
would not be liable for consequential damages in action on the case by railroad
company. Id.
8- If railroad constructing its road under grant of right of way, fails to build
necessary culverts, by reason whereof surface water is turned upon lands of
grantor, it will be liable for damages, and cannot set off incidental benefits to
grantor from construction of road. Gilbert v. Railroad, 150.
9. Contract between two connecting roads for division of earnings according
to respective distances of carriage, is iithin discretionary powers of directors,
and its execution cannot be enjoined at instance of stockholder, who does not
show dishonest or fraudulent purpose in making contract, and that he will be
injured thereby. Elkins v. Railroad Co., 286.
10. In application for such an injunction by stockholder of one road, the
other is necessary party. Id.
11. Directors, without authority by statute or charter, passed resolution (sub-
ject to approval of stockholders at special meeting provided for therein), to
assume certain debts and buy majority of stock and bonds and the equipment
of rival road. Held, that proposed purchase was ultra vires and against public
policy. Id. 287.
12. Clerk in railroad was entrusted with refunding certificates in blank to
be filled up and delivered to holders of coupons. He fraudulently filled up
some of certificates and disposed of them. Held, that company was responsible
to innocent purchaser, and that facts that certificates happened to be in hands
of party who was an agent of company, or that they happened to represent on
their face that coupons had been deposited by such person, were insufficient to
discredit certificates. Railroad Co. v. Bank, 816.
13. Before entering train, plaintiff asked engineer if it would stop at Tilton,
who replied that he did not know, but that they would stop at Beardsley's.
Thereupon plaintiff entered car orderly and decently, with money to pay his
passage, and thereby became passenger. Afterwards, on asking conductor
same question, conductor without provocation cursed, abused and ill-treated
plaintiff, striking him with lantern and finally knocking him out of car door.
Held, that declaration setting out these facts was not for breach of contract, but
in trespass on the case. Turner v. Railroad, 551.
14. Evidence of above facts sufficient to carry case to jury. id.
RATIFICATION. See MORTGAGE, 2.
RECEIVER. See ASSIGNMENT, 11.
1. Creditors without judgment or lien, title or interest attaching to debtor's
property, have no right, as a general rule, to injunction and receiver, and even
after judgment there must be some special circumstances to authorize equitable
interference. Dodge v. Ilan. Co., 151.
2. Receiver of railroad was appointed at instance of bondholders, under or-
der of court "to pay'running expenses and expenses of receivership, and to pay
debts due by said company for labor and supplies that may have accrued in main-
tenance of such property within six months preceding the rendition of this decree."I
Road was sold under decree of foreclosure and did not realize enough to pay
bonds. While in receiver's hands, excess above running expenses was de-
voted to improvement of property. Held, that income of receivership having
been so applied with consent of bondholders, fund in court could le appro-
priated as far as necessary to supply claims especially provided for when
receiver was appointed. Union Trust v. Souther, 551.
3. EXTnA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF REcOvEas s, 289.
RELEASE. See AOoD, 2. CONTRAOT, 1. PAT3ENT, 2.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETY. See INJUNCTION, 7.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See UNITED STATES, 5. UNITED STATES
COURTS, 5.
VOL. =X-109
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1. Appeal lies from order of Superior Court, granting petition for removal to
U. S. Circuit Court. Ellis v. Railroad Co., 816.
2. Bond filed with petition for removal contained condition that petitioner
"shall enter in such Circuit Court, on the first day of its session next after the
granting of said petition, a copy of the record." That next session was the
next after thefiling of the petition. Held, that the variation in form of bond
from words of sect. 689, Rev. Stat., was immaterial. Id.
3. Company incorporated by two states cannot remove into United States
Court suits brought against it in either by citizen thereof. Railroad Co. v.
Alabama, 624.
4. Individual members of corporation created by a foreign state are conclu-
sively presumed to be citizens of that state. Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 78.
5. Sufficient if citizenship appear affirmatively, by. record. Id.
6. Upon filing petition and bond, jurisdiction of state court absolutely
ceases, and it is not restored by failure to file the transcript within the time
prescribed. Id.
7. Petition and bond were duly filed, and state court ruled suit not remova-
ble ; party seeking to remove consented to reference, and contested suit to final
judgment in state courts; held, that jurisdiction of state court was not thereby
restored. Id.
8. Person acting as guard in aid of U. S. marshal officially engaged in
enforcing revenue law, is acting under authority of that law, and entitled to
have prosecution against him for act done in performance of his duty, removed
into United States Circuit Court under sect. 643 of Rev. Stat. Davis v.
South Carolina, 624.
9. To secure the benefit of separable controversy provision in Act of 1875,
where suit was begun before actwas passed, required an application to remove
at or before the term at which case could first be tried after act went into oper-
ation. Myers v. Swan, 487.
10. Where legal title is in certain defendants whose presence is necessary to
get equitable owner out of possession, they are not nominal but necessary par-
ties, and being of same citizenship with plaintiffs, suit cannot be removed under
local prejudice act. Id.
11. In will case two contestants were citizens of other states, and remaining
contestants and executors citizens of Michigan : each set of contestants took an
appeal. Beld, that there was but one contest, and that the appeal by citizens
of other states was not removable. Fraser v. Jennison, 151.
12. Where upon removal of cause from state court, copy of record is not
filed within time fixed by statute, it is within legal discretion of federal court
to remand the cause, and order remanding it for that reason should not be dis-
turbed unless it clearly appears that discretion has been improperly exercised.
Railway Co. v. AlcLean, 423.
13. If upon first removal, federal court remands cause because of failure to
file copy in time, party is not entitled to file second petition for removal on
same ground. Id.
REPLEVIN. See ATTACHMENT, 2. SnErinir, 3
1. Does not lie at common law by one out of possession of realty against
one in adverse possession to recover chattels severed from the realty. Renick
v. Boyd, 307, and note.
2. Where statute authorizes a recovery for timber, lumber, coal " or other
property" severed from the realty, those words only include property ejusdem
generis and not growing crops. .d.
3. Tannery owner, when removing hides omitted some. Tannery was sold,
and many years after, plaintiff while laboring for defendant, in erecting fac-
tory on premises, discovered these hides. Held, that owner had not lost title,
and that finder acquired none. Livermore v. White, 423.
4. A. exchanged horses with B., then B. exchanged with C., without notice
to C. of any infirmity of title. B. did not own horse he let A. have, and A.
had to give him up to true owner. Then A. sought to reclaim from C. his
original horse. Held, that C.'s title was good. Tourtellott v. Pollard, 423.
5. One of principals to replevin bond was a married woman and a minor.
INDEX.
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Held, that only she and defendant in replevin could take advantage of her dis-
ability, not her co-obligors. Goodell v. Bates, 423.
6. Where ordinance of municipal corporation provides that owners of horses
or mules should not permit same to run at large within city limits, and subjects
one violating its terms to fine therefor, if city marshal impound mischievous
horse running at large in streets, owner cannot proceed against him by posses-
sory warrant. King v. Ford, 551.
7. By common law cattle wandering about, damage feasant, might be taken
up and impounded. Id.
RES ADJUDICATA. See ExEcuoros AND AD-M.INIsTrAToS, 2. Fommn
RECOVERY.
Doctrine of, applies to judgments of courts of last resort. Choteau v.
Gibson, 349.
RESCISSION. See CoRPoRATION, 13. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 4.
Must be in tote. Harzfeld v. Converse, 487.
BESIDENCE. See Domicrr.
REVOCATION. See DEED, 1.
REWARD. See CONTRACT, 2, 3.
SALE. See DAMAGES, 6. EVIDENCE, 19. TENDER. VENDOR AND VENDEE.
1. A merchant warrants what he sells to be reasonably suited to the use for
which it is bought. This applies to fertilizers. Barry v. Usry, 349.
2. Upon delivery of goods on executory contract, purchaser, with full oppor-
tunity for examination, waives defects unless he refuses to accept under con-
tract, or accepts only on condition ; mere objection that goods are defective,
insufficient. Olson v. IMayer, 287.
3. Delivery of bill of parcels to purchaser, who thereupon gives to seller lease
of same chattel, without other delivery or change of possession, is not sufficient
to pass title against subsequent purchaser in good faith from original seller.
Harlow v. Hlall, 78.
4. By conditional sale of wagon if vendee failed to pay note, he forfeited
what he had paid, and vendor could take wagon. There was failure to fully
pay; but vendor allowed wagon to remain with vendee, and accepted pay-
ments after last instalment was due. Without making demand he brought suit
to recover balance of note, attaching wagon and holding it by virtue of attach-
ment until trial commenced, when he entered nonsuit and claimed to hold it
under contract. Held, if demand were necessary, bringing of suit was sufficient;
that by making attachment, defendant did not waive his right under condi-
tional sale, nor was he estopped from asserting it; and that lie did not waive
forfeiture by accepting payments after note was due. Matthews v. Lucia,
692.
SEAL. See Binr.s Ar NoTEs, 5.
'SET OFF. See RusnAx? AND WIFE, 8. RiaoAD, 8.
SHERIFF. See EQuiTY, 10. OFrIcER, 3, 4.
1. Sheriff who suffers arrested debtor to escape is liable in his official char-
acter and not as bail; and has no remedy over against debtor. Carpenter v.
Ffield, 552.
2. Officer who allows one lawfully arrested to go at large without taking bail,
suffers escape of such person. Id.
3. Where property levied on has been replevied, replevin bond is substituted
for levy; and if the officer deprives plaintiff of advantages to he derived from
bond, action will lie against him for breach of duty in not making money
under his process ; and in such cases a liberal protection will be extended
over the rights of parties equitably interested against acts of mere nominal par-
ties. Harrison v. .M1axwell, 151.
SHERIFF'S SALE
1. Plaintiff purchasing at execution sale is presumed to have notice of all
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defects in record and proceedings, and will not be protected as bona fide pur-
chaser if notice was insufficient. Collins v. Smith, 552.
2. Title of party in possession, to standing crops, is not divested until execu-
tion of sheriff's deed; and if fully matured at that time they will not pass by
conveyance. Everingham v. Braden, 151.
SHIPPING.
1. Collision between vessels through negligence of either, without waves or
wind or difficulty of navigation contributing to accident, is not "a peril of the
sea" within that exception in a bill of lading. Woodley v. Michell, 757.
2. Where under charter-party or contract of affreightment, duty of discharg-
ing vessel rests upon affreighters and they neglect to perform same seasonably
they will not be relieved from payment of damages by omission of express
provision for payment of demurrage, or express agreement as to number of lay
days. Hayden v. Whitmore, 287.
3. Where through negligence of those managing steam tug in towing
schooner in navigable waters of Chicago river, schooner is run into elevator on
land, breaking same and causing loss of quantity of grain, tort is not within
exclusive jurisdiction of court of admiralty ; state courts may afford remedy.
Johnson v. Elevator Co., 487.
SLANDER.
No defence that words are spoiten, when no one else is present, to person
who knows thetb to be false and does not repeat them until after action brought.
Marble v. Chapin, 78.
SPECIFIC PERFORM\LANCE.
1. Purchaser of land has right to good and marketable title; one about
which there is no doubt that would produce a bona fide hesitation in the mind
of the judge passing upon it. Gill v. Wells, 487.
2. SPECIFIC EroncsExT OP CONTRACTS To TRANSFER STOcs, 489.
STATUTE. See JURY, 1. LImITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3. MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIoN, 12. OtDINANCE. IEPLEVIN, 2.
1. Statute of one state or country re-enacted in another, wil there be given
same construction. Skrainka v. Allen, 487.
2. Statute revising whole subject-matter of former statute and evidently in-
tended as substitute for it, repeals it withoutexpress words. State v. Boller, 692.
3. An affirmative statute to repeal a prior law must express such purpose, or
be in irreconcilable conflict with it, or cover the whole ground occupied by it.
Red Rock v. Henry, 349.
4. Where act is made punishable by fine and imprisonment, words in which
offence is defined and punishment prescribed must be strictly construed. Shultz
v. Cambridge, 222.
5. General words following particular and specific words, must generally be
confined to things of same kind. Id.
6. In ordinance prohibiting saloon-keepers from permitting at, in or about
doors, windows, openings, or in interior of saloons, "any blind, screen, painted
or frosted glass, shade, curtain or other device," words "other device" do not
embrace board partition between different rooms, extending from floor to ceil-
ing, fastened in usual manner, and intended, when made, as permanent acces-
sion to realty. Id.
STOCK. See ESTOPPEL, 3. SrCIn'C PERFORIANCE, 2-.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. See CommoN CAmuER, 5.
SUBROGATION. See INSURANCE, 24.
SUNDAY. See CRIsNAL LAW, 29. NEGLIGENCE, 20.
SURETY. See ADMIRALTY, 2. BAIL. BILLS AND NoTEs, 24, 25. GUARDIAN
AND WARD. MORTGAGE, 7-9.
1. Verbal notice to creditor to proceed against debtor insufficient to release
surety. Petty v. Douglass, 488.
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2. If surety in replevin bond given by administrator pay judgment, he can
recover amount from sureties in probate bond. State v. Farrar, 692.
3. Sureties on executor's general bond not liable for failure to pay over
balance of proceeds of sale of real estate, for which special bond has been given.
Robinson v. Millard, 350.
4. Sureties upon official bond of city treasurer are not liable where munici-
pality induced and was privy to misconduct of treasurer, alleged as breach of
bond. Newark v. Dckerson, 552.
5. That book-keeper is also teller will not relieve his sureties as book-keeper,
unless errors were connected with some improper act as teller or superinduced
by his employment as such. Bank v. Traube, 79.
6. Such interchange of assistance between bank officers, as temporary need
may require, is fairly within contemplation of appointment of such officer, and
his sureties are liable for default made while temporarily filling place of another
officer. Bank v. Zeigler, 249, and note.
7. Liability of sureties on official bonds of public officers. Id., note.
TAX AND TAXATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAv, 36. EQUITY, 7. 'MuNi-
CIPAL ConronATiox, 3, 12, 14. PAYMENT, 1.
1. Municipal corporations can not exempt from or commute taxes. State v.
Railroad Co., 79.
2. United States commissioners established rule that they would receive taxes
on property advertised for sale only from the owner in person. Held, that the
rule avoided the sale. Kaufman and Strong v. Lee, 151.
3. Mortgagor bound to pay taxes, or his tenant, cannot permit estate to be
sold for them, and by purchase acquire title against mortgagee; nor can tenant
for life or years against reversioner. Dunn v. Snell, 152.
4. If owner of credits reside in state, there is jurisdiction over his person and
credits, which in law, in absence of anything showing a stus elsewhere, accom-
pany him: if absent, but credits are in fact here, in hands of agent, for renewal
or collection, with view of re-loaning money by agent as permanent business,
they have a situs here for purpose of taxation. Goldgart v. People, 624.
5. Non-resident creditor, having debts due him from residents of state not
put into hands of agent here, is not liable to taxation in this state. k?.
6. Court will not enjoin collection of taxes, due and unpaid, if same are
legally imposed. That assessment is not strictly according to letter of law
is insufficient. And when there is no ground for enjoining collection of tax,
collector cannot be enjoined from making tax deed to holder of certificate of
purchase, unless for matters transpiring since sale. Moore v. Tayman, 816.
TELEGRAPH.
1. Condition on printed blank "that no claim for damages shall be valid
unless presented in writing within twenty days from sending the message," is
valid. Delay in receiving message, occasioned by mistake of company, would
not modify condition, if reasonable time was left, after knowledge of mistake,
to present claim. Herman v. Tel. Co., 624.
2. Reasonableness of time fixed to be determined by court. Id.
TENDER.
Not necessary, though required by contract, where other party declares that,
if tendered, property will not be accepted by reason of alleged defect therein.
Tullos v. Rogers, 692.
TITLE. See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE,
TORT.
Joint defendants in action of tort are liable in solido, and verdict can not be
apportioned. Keegar v. Haydn, 693.
TRADEMARK,
1. Use of trademark which misrepresents person by whom, and place where,
article was manufactured, not enjoined. Medicine Co. v. Wood, 488.
2. When right to use trademark is transferred to others, semble, that fact of
transfer should be stated in connection with its use. Id.
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3. Trader has right to make and sell machines similar in form and construe-
tion to those of rival trader, and in describing and advertising his own machines,
to refer to rival's machines and rival's name, provided he does this in such a
way as to obviate reasonable possibility of misunderstanding or deception.
Singer Manuf. Co. v. Looq, 509, and note.
TRESPASS. See Fo o IL ENTRY. INJuNCTioN, 6. NEGLIGENCE, 11.
1. Does not lie for waste committed upon land by permission of person in
possession, though unlawfully so. Remedy is an action of unlawful detainer,
in which waste and injury committed may be recovered as well as possession.
Hawkins v. Roby, 693.
2. Where person holds under paper title apparently good and is in actual
possession of part of land, possession of part is possession of whole, and he
can maintain trespass quare clausum fregit. Parker v. Wallis, 757.
3. Where defendant, not being owner, dug sand on land from time to time and
sold same, his entries for that purpose were successive acts of trespass. Id.
4. Owner of land may enter and expel with reasonable necessary force
wrongful occupant without being liable in trespass quare clausum, or for as-
sault and battery; or for injury to occupant's goods, even if force used would
subject owner to indictment at common law for breach of peace, or under stat-
ute for forcible entry. Souter v. Codman, 424.
TRIAL.
1. Request for charge on weight of testimony, improper. Lanydon v. Ins.
Co., 388.
2. Where instructions of court give party benefit of all the law asked by his
own prayers, he cannot object because they do not give more. .Repp v. Berger,
757.
3. Case not to be withdrawn from jury unless testimony so conclusive as to
compel court to set aside verdict in opposition to it. Ins. Co. v. Doster, 60.
4. Jury'reported they were unable to agree, whereupon, defendant being
present but his counsel not, justice gave additional instructions to jury and
caused phonographic clerk to read his report of defendant's evidence. After
verdict for plaintiff: Held, that defendant had no ground. for exception.
Brothers v. Gardiner, 552.
5. Where failure to offer material evidence in proper time is result of inad-
vertence, and it is not kept back by trick or for any unfair purpose, and the
other party will not be deceived or injuriously affected by it, it should be let in,
even after demurrer to evidence has been sustained: refusal so to do will be
ground of reversal. Tierney v. Spira, 488.
6. Court propounded to jury certain questions, covering only part of mate-
rial issues of fact. These and answers were returned as special verdict.
There was no general verdict or bill of exceptions showing evidence adduced.
Judgment recited that it was rendered "upon the special verdict of the jury,
and facts credited or not disputed upon the trial." Held, as facts set out in
special verdict were insufficient to sustain judgment, and as without waiver
(against which was every reasonable presumption), it was constitutional right
of defendants to have jury pass on all material facts in issue; judgment must
be reversed and new trial had. Hodges v. Easton, 223.
TROVER. See CGihirom CARRIER, 4. FixTUnEs, 9, 11, 12.' PLEADING, 3.
1. Minor who hires vehicle to drive to certain place, and then drives else-
where, is liable in trover for conversion. JFr-eeman v. Boland, 424.
2. One who innocently obtains another's property from third person may,
when informed of true ownership, lawfully return it to person from whom he
obtained it, provided he does this before demand or suit; but asserting title in
himself or returning it after demand, is a conversion. Rembaugh v. Phipps,
79.
3. Plaintiff sold herd of cattle conditionally, taking note and lien by which
they were to remain his until note was "fully paid." Vendee, without knowl-
edge of plaintiff, sold part of cattle to defendants, who paid him, and he paid
plaintiff, who endorsed it on note. In action of trover, note remaining unpaid,
held, that defendants were liable; and that money paid by them could not be
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allowed in mitigation of damages, even though identical bank bills were sent to
plaintiff. M1organ v. Kidder, 693.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See ASSIGNM1ENT, 10. EQUITY, 2. GIFT, 3. Lim"
ITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 12. MORTGAGE, 4. PARTNnRSHIP, 14. WILL, 1,
5, 6, 12, 15.
1. If one person purchases land with money of another, and takes deed in
his own name, though done by verbal agreement, a resulting trust arises, en-
forceable in court of equity. McNaniara v. Garrity, 624.
2. If legatee and cestui que trust fraudulently receives from executor and
trustee part of principal, and converts it to his own use, subsequent trustee
may retain, out of income afterwards coming to cestui que trust, the amount so
converted. Crocker v. Dillon, 218.
3. Where power of sale is given to raise particular charge only, and purpose
can be answered better by mortgage than by sale, and that method is not viola-
tive of intention of grantor, the former mode of raising the money should be
preferred. Lobenthal v. Raleigh, 282.
4. Will creating trust contained following clause: "My said trustee shall
have power to invest, and change the investment of said moiety, and for that
purpose to sell, convey and dispose thereof, or any part thereof, as often as he
may think proper." Held, 1. That this did not authorize trustee to mortgage
property, to secure repayment of loan. 2. That cestui que trust, on arriving
at age, could, with full knowledge of law and facts, confirm such a mortgage.
Wilson v. Life Ins. Co., 817.
5. Words in will "at the decease of my wife, Esther, I give and bequeath
all my estate, real and personal, for the preaching of the gospel of the blessed
Son of God, as taught by the people known now as Disciples of Christ. The
preaching to be well and faithfully done in Lorain county, in Birmingham, and
at Berlin, in Erie county, Ohio, and I nominate and appoint John Cyrenius,
Silas Wood and Samuel Steadman, executors of this item of my last will and
testament, and I request them to do the business without remuneration," cre-
ate a valid trust. Sowers v. Cyrenius, 350.
6. One cannot settle property in trust to pay income to himself for life with
provision against alienation by anticipation, so as to prevent creditors reaching
the income by bill in equity, and this rule applies to married woman settling
her separate property after marriage, where she has the right to make contracts
as if sole. Pacific ANat. Bank v. Windram, 350.
7. Donor may settle property in favor of third person with provision
against alienation of income by anticipation or subjection of same to creditors
in advance of payment, although there is no cesser or limitation in such an
event. Broadway Nat. Bank v. Adams, 350.
8. Widow set apart portion of husband's insurance money, in trust for
infant daughter, to be paid her on reaching majority, and loaned same, the
notes and mortgages running to herself as trustee for daughter. With portion
of fund she afterwards purchased land, taking deed in same way. This real
estate was by her procurement conveyed, through third person, to her second
husband (who had full knowledge of the trust) without consideration. On bill
filed by daughter after ariving at full age, held, 1. That mother was trustee for
child ; 2. That trust of personal property is not within Statute of Frauds ; 3.
That trust was not revocable ; 4. That trustee of personal property cannot
rightfully change same into real estate; but when so changed the property will
be subject to trust in hands of grantee without consideration and with notice.
Cobb v. Knight, 287.
9. Orator was trustee under deed of trust, acting from 1865 to 1880. He
boarded his ward, who was non corapos mentis, acting as his guardian, though
not legally appointed, and owed him note of $800, given in 1864. Trust
property consisted of real estate, which on death of beneficiary, without
children, was to be divided between heirs of grantor, of whom trustee was
one. Beneficiary having deceased, in settlement of administration in chancery
between trustee and other heirs, Held, 1. Trustee cannot plead statute of
limitations as to note. 2. Only income of trust property could be appropriated
to support of ward until his other property was used up. 3. Annual balance
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of trustee's appropriations in behalf of ward above income of trust property
law will apply on said note. Chamberlin v. Estey, 817.
I0. Testator willed both realty and personalty to each of two sons : after-
wards he added following, in codicil : "I do hereby revoke the said legacies
by my said will given to my said son, Jerome C. Bacon, and I do give to my
son, Delos M. Bacon, all of said legacies in trust, as follows: Thar the same
be kept by the said Delos M., until in the judgment of the said Delos M., the
said Jerome C. shall prove himself worthy of receiving the same, and then
and not till then to deliver the same to the said Jerome C. Bacon. Itis further
my will that if my said son, Delos Al. shall not at any time judge it best to de-
liver said property to my said son Jerome C., that the same shall be and remain
the property of my said son, Delos M., and his heirs forever." Held, that there
was an express trust for benefit of Delos M., on condition that lie proves him-
self worthy, of which trustee is made judge, but that court will control his
judgment and discretion to extent of compelling an honest exercise thereof.
Bacon v. Bacon, 694.
UNDUE ITILUENCE.
To influence weak-minded person to do what is just and for his best
good, is not unlawful. Dailey v. Kastel, 288.
UNITED STATES. See INTOXICATING LIQuORs, 1. NATIONAL BANNS, 7.
1. Subject to same exemptions as private persons in executions in civil
actions. Fink v. O'Neil, 223.
2. Under schedule D. of sect. 2504, Rev. Stat., bottles in which ale and
beer are imported are subject to duty of 30 per cent. ad valorem, in addition to
the duty of thirty-five cents per gallon on the ale and beer imported in the
bottles. Schmidt v. Badger, 552.
3. United States cannot be sued except where congress has provided for it;
but its officers and agents are not thus exempt when sued for property in their
possession as such. Kaqfman v. Lee, 79.
4. Constitutional provisions that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law nor private property taken for public use
without just compensation, bind the courts to give remedy for unlawful inva-
sion of rights of property by officers of any branch of the government. Id.
5. Such suits are always removable to the United States courts. Id.
6. Under Act of Congress of August 5th 1861, exporter of articles manu-
factured from imported materials was entitled to drawback equal in amount to
duty paid on such materials, less ten per cent., "to be ascertained under such
regulations as shall be prescribed by the secretary of the treasury." Regula-
tions were duly established, but in this case, collector, under instructions from
secretary, refused to act. Held, that exportor's right could not be thus de-
feated, and that Court of Claims had jurisdiction. Campbell v. United States,
694.
7. Under sect. 2499 of Rev. Stat., when article is found not enumerated in
tariff laws, first inquiry is whether it hears similitude in material, quality, tex-
ture or use to any article enumerated ; if it does, and similitude is substantial,
it is deemed the same and charged accordingly. If nothing such is found
inquiry is as to component materials and duty is at highest rates chargeable on
any of same. Collector v. Fox, 694.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See ComMroN CARIER, 14. CORPORATION, 18,
22. ERRORs AND A -P EALS, 2. MUNIOIPAL CORPORATION, 7. REMOVAL
OF CAUSES. UNITED STATES, 6.
1. Owner of coupons payable to bolder, not assignee within Act of March
3d 1875, and therefore his right of suit in federal court does not depend upon
citizenship of any previous holder. Thompson v. Perrine, 223.
2. Michigan corporation needing to sue city of Detroit, local prejudice was
feared, and directors refused to institute proceedings, and thereupon stockholder
and director residing in New York brought suit in United States Circuit Court.
Held, that circumstances showed refusal of directors to Le collusive, and that
suit must be dismissed as at least within purview of sect. 5 of Act of March 3d
1875. Detroit v. Dean, 223.
INDEX. 873
UNITED STATES COURTS.
3. While Illinois statute giving right of redemption, first to mortgagor, then
to judgment creditors, is rule of property obligatory upon federal court, it can
by rules prescribe mode in which redemption from sales under its own decrees
may be effected. Ins. Co. v. Cuslnan, 757.
4. When maker of promissory note negotiable by law merchant secures it by
mortgage made by himself to payee, and both are citizens of same state, en-
dorsee of note can, since Act of March 3d 1875, c. 137, sue in U. S. Courts
to foreclose mortgage. Tredway v. Sanger, 488.
5. Illinois statute was construed by Supreme Court of Missouri, and that
decision afterwards pleaded by way of estoppel in another suit, in state court
of Missouri, between same parties, where precisely same question was raised.
Allegation was made that full faith and credit had not been given to public acts
of state of Illinois by decision in question, and suit removed to U. S. Court.
Held, that mistake in decision of first case could only be corrected by proceed-
ing instituted directly for that purpose, that operation of judgment in that case
as estoppel in this did not depend on constitution or laws of United States, but
on effect of judgment under laws of Missouri, and that there was consequently
no right of removal. Railroad Co. v. Ferry Co., 694.
USURY. See ASSIGNMENT, 4. NATIONAL BANxs, 2.
1. A usury statute avoided the interest only and a subsequent constitution
abolished all usury laws. Held, that as to contract made while usury statute
was in force the constitution took away the defence. well v. Daggs, 350.
2. Citizen of one state may contract in another for loan of money to be used
in his own state, and agree to pay interest lawful by laws of latter state though
in excess of that allowed in state where contract is made. Scott v. Perlee,
469.
3. In such a case it is not essential that note should be expressly made pay-
able in state where maker resides; all the surrounding circumstances will be
examined to ascertain whether parties intended, in good faith, to contract with
reference to laws of that state. Id.
VENDOR AND VENDEE. See COVENANT, 3, 4. DAMAGES, 7.
1. Purchaser of equitable title to land takes subject to all equities between
vendor and holder of legal title at time of purchase. Jasper Co. v. Tavis, 351.
2. Taking of trust deed by vendor of land is waiver of implied lien for pur-
chase-money, and the same becomes his sole security. Rlydner v. Frank, 424.
3. One purchasing land and receiving deed of general warranty, without
knowledge of mortgage made by grantor, which, however, was duly recorded,
acquires only equity of redemption, notwithstanding fact that mortgagee, from
time to time, after purchase, for valuable consideration, extend time of payment
until mortgagor becomes insolvent. Kuhns v. McGea. 223.
4. Upon bill for rescission of sale of land, alleging that vendor falsely repre-
sented it contained valuable iron-ore, defendant denied upon oath that such
representation was made; but court, upon proof that complainant purchased
land for mining, that ore was valueless, that price was $2500, and land worth
only $250, declared inadequacy so gross as to amount to fraud, and rescinded
sale. Peacham v. Reagan, 223.
VERDICT. See TOaT.
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 10, 11.
WAGER. See CONTRACT, 12, 13. IzsunANoE, 6, 21.
WAGES. See ATTACR3S1=, 1, 8.
WAIVER. See INSURANCE, 4, 24. SALE, 4.
WARRANTY. See BILLs AND NOTES, 20. _NSiP..iCc, 20. LANDLORD AND
TENANT, 3. SALE, 1. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 3.
I. WAtRANTIES IMPLIED IN SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IN TEE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA, 85, 153, 225.
2. EXPRESS WARRANTIES IN SALES Op PERSONAL PROPERTY IN TIE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA, 553.
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WASTE. See TREsPAsS, 1.
Action will lie against tenant from year to year for permissive. lNewbold v.
Brown, 152.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
1. Person owning land abutting on river and through which creek flows and
empties into river, may, as against proprietors on opposite side of river, change
channel and mouth of creek upon his own land, if he exercises reasonable care
and caution, and if increased danger of overflow might not reasonably be
anticipated therefrom. Railroad v. Carr, 224.
2. Riparian owner cannot, except as against himself, confer on one who is
not riparian owner any right to use water of stream. Ormerod v. Mill Co.,
757.
3. Owner of land not abutting on river, with license of riparian owner, took
water from river and after use returned it undiminished and unpolluted. Held,
that lower riparian owner could not obtain injunction. Kensit v. Railroad Co.,
758.
WAY.
1. In absence of express grant, adverse, exclusive and uninterrupted enjoy-
ment of right of way for twenty years is necessary: and when so established,
same length of time is necessary to lose it by abandonment. Cox v. Forrest, 758.
2. Use of way over land of another, whenever one sees fit, and without
asking leave, is prima fade adverse. Id.
3. By "exclusive," law does not mean that right of way must be used by
one person only, but simply that right should not depend for its enjoyment upon
similar right in others. "Uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment" only
means that party exercises the right more or less frequently, according to nature
of use, and without objection on part of owner of land. .d.
WHARF AND WHARFAGE.
1. Power to erect wharves and charge wharfage not one of implied powers
of municipality nor deducible from authority to regulate streets, lanes and
alleys, and to make laws and regulations for good order and government. 7be
Geneva, 584, and note.
2. Where municipal corporation is riparian proprietor it may charge wharf-
age, but not if wharf extends beyond low-water line, and is principally con-
structed on line of public street. Id.
3. Wharves, their conitruction and management. Id., note.
4. Where under port regulations of Savannah, two vessels were allowed to
lie abreast at wharf, and, for sake of convenience, cargo was carried directly
from one to other without being landed, it being unvarying interpretation that
such transhipments included both landing and shipping, wharf owner would
have right to charge rates allowed for landing and shipping in absence of
contract to contrary. Robertson v. Wilder, 224.
WILL. See CONTRACT, 18. EXECUTOnS AD AD nltISTRATORS, 1. REMOVAL
oF CAusEs, 11. A
1. Provision establishing fund for preservation, adornment and repair of
private monumental structure is void, as creating perpetuity for use not charita-
ble. Bates v. Bates, 695.
2. Right given by will, to sell property for object which cannot be accom-
plished, cannot be exercised. Ad.
3. If will, duly executed and containing clause revoking former wills, is can-
celled, it is question of intention, to be collected from all the circumstances,
whether earlier will, not destroyed, is revived: in absence of affirmative evi-
dence that such was testator's intention, it will be held not to be. Rcsens v.
Davis, 695.
4. Oral declarations made after cancellation, admissible to show intention to
revive former will. id.
5. The rule in Shelley's case gives way to clear intention of testator or donor,
when that intention can be ascertained from instrument in which words sup-
posed to be words of limitation are used. BeIslag v. Engle, 818.
6. Where language shows clear intent to devise fee to wife, words of recom-
mendation or suggestion or advice as to management or occupation of the lands
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by family, contained in other clauses, will not limit her estate. Hoxsey v.
.Hoxsey, 759. 6.
7. Where first taker in lands has absolute estate, limitation over, by way of
executory devise, is bad. Id.
8. If testatrix has given instructions for will, and it is prepared in accord-
ance with them, will is valid though at time of execution she merely recollects
giving the instructions, but believes that will is in accordance with them.
Parker v. Felgate, 758.
9. Where testator devises all his property to wife for life or widowhood, and
directs that upon her death or marriage, same be equally divided between his
children, their heirs and assigns forever, children take by purchase and not by
descent. Donnelly v. Turner, 758.
10. Exclusive owner of property can enter into contract to execute will in
favor of other contracting party. And if will so executed be cancelled, aid of
court of equity can be invoked, Wilks v. Burns, 758.
11. But where power of disposition by will is given to person having no
reversionary interest, attempted execution of power by will made in conformity
with alleged contract, is invalid. The power is not thereby exhausted, and
such will is revoked by subsequent will duly admitted to probate. Id.
12. Where devise was to trustees for use and benefit of testator's daughters,
without any words of limitation or perpetuity, Held, 1. That it made no differ-
ence that property was left in hands of trustees. 2. That since Maryland act
of 1825, a general devise in which words of limitation or perpetuity are
omitted, will pass whole interest of testator, in absence of contrary ixtention.
Fairfax v. Brown, 759.
13. Testator directed all his property to be sold. He bequeathed to T. B. H.,
as guardian of his son, $1500 of proceeds to be expended in son's education,
as guardian might think proper. In will was following clause : "I will and
direct that the balance of said proceeds, after deducting said several sums here-
inbefore named, if any, be divided equally between my brothers." Held, that
balance of said $1500 unexpended on arrival at age of son, belonged to son.
Nyce v. Nyce, 351.
14. Probate of will in another state is judicial proceeding to record of which
faith and credit is to be given, when authenticated as required by Act of Con-
gress. Bradstreet v. Kinsella, 351.
15. Testator declared it to be his will and desire that his wife should have
certain lands, "with a special request that at her death she give the said lands
to be equally divided between her near relatives and mine." The wife having
died without disposing of property, Held, that trust was created for benefit of
"near relatives" of wife and testator in equal proportions, and that "1 near
relatives" meant those who would take under statute of distributions. Hand-
ley v. Wrqhtson, 817.
WITNESS See CRnaLA LAw, 4, 7. EVIDENCE, 9-I1. PROCESS, 1.
Where witness on cross examination, being asked questions, which answered
affirmatively, would tend to degrade and disgrace him, avails himself of privi-
lege accorded by court and declines to answer, he can not be asked "why ?"
Merluzzi v. Gleeson, 351.
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